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This thesis provides a new specification development process for Ground 
Combat Vehicles (GCVs). The most recent development programs for such a 
vehicle class failed due to extensive cost overruns. The author uses agent-based 
simulation to model and study the impacts of CGV capabilities in a most likely 
combat scenario according to the current threat assessment of the U.S. 
government. The most advanced modern weapon systems are used as a 
baseline performance and extensive research is done to determine the state-of-
the-art technologies available. These experimental technologies are then 
transferred to feasible ranges for specified performance factors for GCVs, such 
as engagement range, weapon’s lethality, armor, and mobility. Nearly orthogonal 
and space-filling designs are used to efficiently construct a response surface 
consisting of defined measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for GCVs. For each 
MOE, a meta-model is fitted that includes the most significant factors, 
interactions, and non-linarites. These models are then combined to find the most 
“robust” solution since a model will never exactly depict the real situation and a 
GCV will not be deployed in a scenario exactly like the one used in the study. 
The results of the meta-models will be used by the Department of Systems 
Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School to create a “dashboard” for 
visualization of the tradeoff effects between performance factors. 
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Since the cancelation of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2009, 
there has been increasing criticism of the follow-on Ground Combat Vehicle 
(GCV) project and the observed difficulties in many ground combat system 
acquisition efforts conducted internationally. The question arises as to whether 
there is a better way to determine the specifications for such a system, and, if so, 
how these specifications can be adapted when changes become necessary. The 
purpose of this thesis is to provide decision makers with additional information to 
enable them to reduce the cost and time of such an acquisition project while 
enhancing the overall performance of the end system. The author suggests that 
the following analysis be conducted before the specifications of a GCV are fixed 
and whenever these specifications are changed: 
1. Perform an analysis to determine the scenarios in which the new 
system will most likely be deployed, and what measurements of 
effectiveness (MOEs) it must achieve. Critical thresholds and the 
weighting of the MOEs must be defined for this analysis. 
2. Use these scenarios to set up a combat simulation. It is important 
to study the GCV in context with already existing combat systems 
as there are interactions between the different systems. The study 
detailed in this thesis uses Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata-V 
(MANA-V) as it is an agent-based simulation which not only models 
human behavior, but also is capable of replicating numerous 
scenarios in a reasonable amount of time. MANA-V has a steep 
learning curve as well as a capacity for data farming, and most 
important, it is designed to get quick insights and identify major 
dependencies. The drawback of MANA-V is that the physical 
resolution is low. 
3. Define the ranges of the possible specification parameters 
according to subject matter experts, battlefield experiences, field 
studies, and literature research; and combine them into a design of 
experiment (DOE). This study uses a Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) design. The advantage is that NOLHs allow you 
to efficiently explore the whole range of the 14 input parameters 
with only 65 data points in a reasonable timeframe. 
4. Run the simulation with a calculated number of replications to 
achieve the desired resolution. Here, a casualty rate of ±1 per 
 xxii 
battle is the desired resolution. This leads to 460 replications per 
design point to achieve a statistical power of 0.9. After the 
experiments are conducted, collect the output data on the MOEs. 
5. Analyze the data with different statistical tools to identify the most 
influential factors on MOE performance. The tools used in this 
study are regression models and partition trees. The regression 
models are divided into main effect models and models which allow 
for interactions between the factors as well as non-linearities. The 
analysis is done for each MOE separately. 
6. Select the best models during the analysis process to create a 
meta-model for each MOE which describes how the MOE changes 
with changes of the input factors. For example, if a factor such as 
armor is changed, how does it affect the expected casualties of the 
GCV and the whole deployed force? 
7. Conduct an analysis of the meta-models to find the most important 
factors for each MOE, their interactions, and the tradeoffs between 
them. The variability of the result must also be considered because 
a higher uncertainty of the results reduces its benefit. A 
specification process must aim for a “robust” solution since the 
scenarios will not be the actual deployment, and the simulation 
does not fully represent the real situation. Insights for specifications, 
tactics, and the necessary force structure must be identified. 
It is planned that the results of the meta-models developed in this 
research will be the input to create a “dashboard” for visualization of the tradeoff 
effects between factors. 
Major Conclusions: 
• The approach detailed in thesis is feasible for land-based systems. 
The most influential factors for each MOE can be identified and 
explained. The approach cannot guarantee an optimal solution, but 
it can give additional insights and direct research for the 
specification finding.  
• Interactions and non-linearities are influential and must be 
considered to estimate the performance of the GCV for a given 
scenario. 
• Survivability of the GCV is a result of different factors which all 




First of all, I want to thank my advisor, Prof. Thomas Lucas, for all the 
valuable hints, experience, and guidance he provided for this thesis. 
Furthermore, I want to thank Mary McDonald who not only did the runs on the 
super cluster, but also provided essential lectures on MANA and statistical tools, 
and who always came back with an answer for my questions in phenomenal 
time. I want to thank Prof. Eugene Paulo and his assistant, Mr. Paul Beery, for 
the basic idea of the “dashboard” and for connecting me with their students to 
leverage the work. Finally, I want to say thank you to the New Zealand MANA 
team and to Dr. Gregory McIntosh, in particular, for providing the combat 
simulation software and for introducing my concerns and suggestions into MANA 
in an uncomplicated and timely manner. 
 
 xxiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “Future Combat Systems” (FCS), a family of 18 manned and 
unmanned networked ground combat vehicles and one of the most ambitious 
programs for army modernization ever, failed in 2009 after the U.S. Army spent 
$19.9 billion in development and research (Billion Lexington institute, 2012). No 
system was built for this money. The official reason for this failure was that the 
FCS could not deal with the evolving threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as these combat systems were designed as light-
armored, highly mobile platforms. FCS’s major advantage was superior 
situational awareness which would enable it to destroy the enemy before he ever 
could get within reach of his target. This was simply not possible with IEDs and 
an adapting enemy. As one involved soldier said, "Of course, the problem with 
this approach is that if you're hit, you die" (GlobalSecurity, 2012).  
The army took the lessons learned in the follow-up program, the “Ground 
Combat Vehicle” (GCV) (Erwin, 2011), which is a program consisting of only one 
vehicle, an infantry carrier for a full squad of nine soldiers and the crew. Two 
major development contracts were issued to BAE Systems and General 
Dynamics Land Systems after the program had been revised in July 2011. The 
specifications for the GCV for survivability led to a behemoth vehicle (72 tons for 
an infantry carrier in the BAE prototype version), which would almost certainly  
be difficult to deploy, costly to maintain, and unaffordable given the fact that 
weight is one of the major cost factors for estimating the price of a combat 
vehicle (Feickert, 2013). So, it is not surprising that the Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) organization estimated the price per vehicle to be 
$16 to $17 million rather than the desired $13 million (in FY2011 constant 
dollars). While the weight of the General Dynamics prototype is not yet known 
officially, a working paper for the Congress issued in November 2012 lists the 
GCV of Dynamics Systems at 64 tons in a basic version, with a potential maximal 
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weight of 74 tons. The maximum weight for the BAE system is stated at 84 tons 
(Feickert, 2013).  
The historical development of U.S. armored vehicles is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Evolution of armored vehicles in the U. S. Army (Cost, weight, and 
protection). The colored sectors show the relative protection levels of 
equivalent steel rolled homogeneous armor provided by the vehicles’ 
base armor. Relative top and bottom protection levels are not shown 
in this figure. All vehicles except the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) 
have minimal protection in these areas. The GCV specification 
requires increased protection for top and bottom. Vehicle icons are 
shown to scale. None of the active protection systems proposed for 
the GCV will provide protection against kinetic-energy rounds  
(From Kempinski & Murphy, 2012). 
Another key consideration for a heavyweight vehicle is that its tactical 
mobility is constricted due the maximum weight class of bridges and the damage 
done to roads. This is a major concern, especially in less developed countries 
and in urban terrain, exactly the environment that is considered to be the most 
likely area of operation in the future. A National Security official stated in a 
Congressional paper dealing with the GCV, “[a] large vehicle is not only difficult 
to transport to the theater and consumes more fuel, it also damages roads and 
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bridges and has trouble traversing narrow urban streets, creating problems in 
peacekeeping and counterinsurgency” (Kempinski & Murphy, 2012). These facts, 
together with expected cuts in the defense budget, led to the conclusion that 
changes in the specification of the GCV or even a reset of the whole program are 
necessary. 
In a time when an ever-faster changing security environment drives an 
even faster adapting threat for deployed forces, it is most likely that changes will 
occur in every major defense acquisition project. As the current specification 
process is not designed to react quickly to new requirements, it leads to the 
impression that there are basic flaws in the acquisition process of military ground 
systems. From the experiences of the author in the German Army and the 
literature research for this thesis, it has become clear that the acquisition process 
is not only a problem for the U.S. forces, but an international one.  Therefore, the 
question arises:  What can be changed to make the specification process better?  
Currently, specifications are drawn from experience obtained in actual 
battles and exercises, then set by subject matter experts, and approved by a 
program manager (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). In the case of the current 
GCV, the U.S. Army set 744 specifications in its request for proposal (RFP), 
where they defined protection against specified threats, the number of soldiers 
and equipment to be transported, and so on (Kempinski & Murphy, 2012).  
Farther along in the acquisition process, the specifications are assessed 
by simulations dealing with potential future scenarios and field tests. These 
specifications are aggregated into parameters like lethality, maneuverability, or 
sustainability. If a parameter specification is not met, changes may be brought 
into the program with corresponding delays and cost increases. After the next 
validation, it may be seen that these changes caused problems in other 
requirements. For example, if survivability is a major concern, then usually more 
armor is added. It is easy to see that “hardening” the system increases 
survivability; however, maneuverability will decrease as a heavier system is 
slower and might even no longer meet the requirements for cost or air transport. 
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Less maneuverability might also decrease survivability again. Even if all the 
specifications and changes are decided by the most experienced subject matter 
experts, it can be seen that the number of specifications is just too high to keep 
all interactions in mind, and with hundreds of specifications it is just not possible 
to define the whole system such that a contractor will build a vehicle with the 
desired overall performance. For example, on their defencetalk homepage BAE 
stated, “Unfortunately, the Pentagon didn’t specify a weight limit in its Request for 
Proposal (RFP), so the GCV came out a bit on the heavy side” (BAE Systems 
Releases, 2012).  
This is not a new problem as, for example, German “tank” development in 
World War II showed the same pattern. To make tanks more survivable the 
Germans developed the “TIGER” model which had heavy armor, but it could not 
uphold previous maneuverability. As German scientists and military leaders 
recognized the weaknesses of the “TIGERS” they developed a more balanced 
one—the “PANTHERS” series—which is recognized as the best performing tank 
of the war, even with less armor (The Armed Forces Military Museum, 2013). To 
deal with this development pattern a better approach must be developed.  
If one analyzes the problem framework, he will find that what a system has 
to achieve is not a certain speed or armor class, but certain measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs)—such as the probability of mission success and expected 
loss rate under most likely conditions. 
For this reason, the specification process of a weapons system must do 
the following: 
• Define major characteristics of the system. 
• Define the most likely scenarios where the system will have 
to perform. 
• Define measures of effectiveness. 
The mission-based approach is especially important as the available force 
structure in a scenario heavily influences the performance requirements of a 
system. For example, if an analyst would use a battle between an enemy and a 
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homogeneous main battle tank force he would find that an increase in the 
weapon range would give the tank force a huge advantage in performance 
according to MOEs such as lethality and survivability. But, what if the scenario 
includes long-range artillery weapons or the terrain would only allow medium 
combat at small distances? Here, the benefit of an increased weapon range 
would be severely reduced. So, it is critical to define the most likely scenarios as 
well as possible stressing scenarios first. 
After the above three steps are performed, the combat system should be 
modeled with a reasonable range of the “normal” specification parameters. 
These ranges are then used as input parameters to perform combat simulations 
within an adequate modeling environment. A sophisticated design of experiments 
(DOE) can be used to efficiently explore the different combinations of parameter 
values and their expected variance (Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, & Cioppa, 2005).  
Once the experimental data is obtained, statistical regression can be used 
to identify the most important input parameters in regard to the MOEs and their 
interactions. This “response surface” is usable to create a meta-model in which 
the tradeoffs between the specification parameters can be visualized. A “meta-
model” is defined in this thesis as an abstract relationship between the MOE and 
the input parameters for the combat simulation in the form of a regression model. 
The results can be applied by engineers to design the physical specifications of a 
system, such as speed, armor, sensors, and so on.  
The end state of this process is that decision makers can immediately see 
what a change in one specification means for the envisioned project and 
therefore helps them to find the right decision without getting surprised. 
So, the described process can be applied at the following points: 
• When designing the specifications for a new system.  
• Whenever changes must be introduced into the program, program 
managers can immediately visualize tradeoffs and therefore decide 
which factors changes must be made while still achieving all MOEs. 
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A. OBJECTIVE STATEMENT 
Future ground combat systems will have to fulfill complex missions in a 
variety of different scenarios throughout the full spectrum of modern warfare, 
including asymmetric scenarios. This fact makes it especially difficult to find the 
right mix of capabilities as the next mission and the corresponding circumstances 
(like enemy, terrain, climate, and so on) remain uncertain. Therefore, for future 
weapon specification processes, the question is not to get it right, but much more 
to get it close and robust enough. This research provides data, results, and 
insights for an alternative, more flexible approach to the specification process. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis research is guided by following questions: 
• Which factors contribute most to defined MOEs in a given 
scenario? 
• Must interactions be considered in the specification process? 
• Must non-linearities be considered in the specification process? 
• Which factors other than armor are major contributors to ground 
combat vehicles survivability and are they quantifiable? 
• Can the specification process for ground combat systems be 
improved and made more flexible with the new approach? 
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C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The desired benefits of the whole project include the following: 
• Improvement in finding and altering the process for specifications of 
GCVs. 
• Instantaneous visualization of how changes in one specification 
requirement influence other requirements. 
• Provision for more fact-based discussion in development and 
change of specification requirements—especially important for joint 
and multinational projects. 
• Provision for non-trained personal to visualize tradeoffs between 
specification factors and the impact of design changes. 
• Improvements to the specification process that reduce costs and 
raise the level of performance and robustness for future ground 
combat systems. 
• Enlargements that could be taken to create a “dashboard” for 
defining the requirements of whole task forces and force structures. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
The thesis divides the research into seven phases (see Figure 2). 
• Define the MOEs for future ground combat systems and their 
critical thresholds.   
• Program realistic scenarios in the MANA-V environment in which 
current systems have to operate as a reference for the performance 
of future systems. 
• Use DOE and data farming techniques to create ranges in the 
specification parameters of future systems.  
• Run simulations according to the design and collect output data. 
• Analyze the results to identify the most influential factors and their 
interactions according to the MOEs and the scenarios. 
• Use regression techniques to create meta-models.  
• Analyze the meta-models and find the most important factors for 
achieving the MOEs and tradeoffs between them. 
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Figure 2.  Graphical process structure of the research thesis. 
The results will then be given to the Systems Engineering Department for 
further use in the creation of the first land combat system “dashboard.” 
E. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
A similar approach has been used for the design of Navy ships at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in cooperation between the Operations 
Research Department and the Systems Engineering Department. The feasibility 
of this specifications approach for surface vessels had been demonstrated by 
three theses in the Systems Engineering Department, the results of which were 
combined into the first version of a visualization tool called a “dashboard.” Welch 
(2011) and Fox (2011) did the basic work with single surface warship scenarios, 
which then were combined by Bahlman (2012). They developed a prototype of 
the so-called “dashboard” with the goal of enabling users to visualize the 
tradeoffs of the specification factors in terms of feasibility. They implemented 
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engineering design knowledge for constructing ships with the requirements for 
fulfilling the defined scenario MOEs (Fox, 2011; Welch, 2011; Bahlman, 2012).  
The conducted theses showed that the approach itself was beneficial for 
constructing better ships and allowing decision makers to visualize the tradeoffs 
between design factors. The major differences between these theses and the 
current study occur in the more complex environment for land systems, the more 
complex approach to considering force structure interactions, and the focus on a 
combat scenario. The current study also differs in testing for interactions between 
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II. SELECTION OF THE INPUT PARAMETER RANGES 
As this study deals with specifications of future ground combat systems 
and uses DOE techniques, two questions must be answered: 
• What are the input parameters that most influence the performance 
of the GCV according to the MOEs? 
• What are reasonable ranges for each of these parameters 
according to possible future technology developments? 
The next chapter answers both of these questions. Note that whenever 
future technology or new untested compositions of mature technologies are used 
there is a probability the actual performance of the subsystem may be worse 
than its approximate performance in previous tests outside the vehicle. 
1. Selection of Input Parameters 
The answer to the first question has two aspects. It is not only what 
influences the performance of the system in the scenario, but also whether these 
parameters can be changed in the MANA software used in this research. When 
factors cannot be set directly, it is often possible in MANA to adjust the scenario 
in an indirect way. 
For selecting possible input parameters, extensive literature research and 
the author’s own experience as a subject matter expert for armored land warfare 
are used. However, a more comprehensive way would be to employ a systems 
engineering design process that would provide both, functional system 
architecture and physical system architecture. The functional architecture links 
the top level system functions to lower level functions and desired capabilities as 
well as to appropriate metrics, specifically measures of performance (MOP).  A 
recent capstone project, conducted by a group of U.S. Army civilian master’s 
students in the Systems Engineering department, developed a functional 
architecture for the GCV as part of a mixed maneuver company of tanks and 
GCVs (Vehicle Survivability Team & Cohort 311-114G, 2013).  Their very 
detailed list of system functions are easily translated into possible model 
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parameters (see Appendix A). A more narrowly list is used in this thesis because 
it focuses on the main factors and because of the restrictions in MANA 
(McIntosh, 2007). The list is divided into three major performance characteristics 
of ground combat systems and supplemental factors: 
a. Lethality 
• Sensor field-of-view 
• Sensor range 
• Sensor quality 
• Main and secondary weapon range 
• Main and secondary weapon precision 
• Main and secondary weapon penetration/effects 
• Communication/Information/Networks 
b. Mobility 
• Speed on different surfaces  
• Acceleration 
c. Protection/Survivability 
• Long range engagement 
• Concealment 




A comparison of the given list with the list in Appendix A shows that 
MANA forced the author to reduce the considered input parameters, but this 
approach provides clear relationships between the major contributing factors. 
Further studies and other software may be used to consider the basic factors in 
more detail. 
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2. Selection of Parameter Ranges 
To make a good estimate of what will be possible in the future, the author 
chose to use the advertised benefits of new technologies for GCV by the most 
important producers of land combat systems. From the experience of the author, 
the suggested performance of these technologies is nearly always overestimated 
as the companies have interests in selling their products, or the performance is 
reduced by additional restrictions imposed when a subsystem is integrated into 
the combat vehicle. Therefore, it is possible to design the upper bounds of the 
input parameter by using the official stated performance parameter of the new 
technologies. It is the author’s hope that this literature review will be a very 
helpful overview for future research in the specification process. The websites of 
the following contractors have been used as a base, and follow-on research has 
been conducted in various Internet sources: Rheinmetall, BAE, General 




For the modeling restriction some agents have been modeled with 
360 degree sensors. In reality, many systems are not deployed in urban terrain 
due their lack of overview and their blind spots—which have proven a major 
disadvantage in urban and close range combat.  
Modern developments for GCVs are now able to address this 
capability gap and provide an armored vehicle, such as theT90MS and the Israeli 
infantry carrier “NAMER,” with “see-through armor” optics providing the crew with 
a 360 degree view around the vehicle. This capability is provided by electro-
optical observation and sighting systems. Drawbacks of the systems are that the 
optics are vulnerable to enemy fire and are often not capable of thermal or night 
vision. Both of these issues can be addressed and are said to be solved by the 
producer. Another unsolved aspect is that the crew of a combat vehicle is still 
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human and, especially if the tendency to reduce the crew to only two people is 
applied, has limited information processing power. It will be difficult to handle all 
the additional information of a 360 degree view together with the view of the 
already established main sights and the normal workload like communications, 
navigating the vehicle, loading the appropriate ammunition, engaging the correct 
target, and so on. Therefore, the crew-size must be considered while equipping a 
vehicle with sensors. Crew size will influence the volume to be armored and 
workload to be done. That a 360 degree field-of-view is feasible can be seen in 
current aircraft where a similar workload must be processed. Most current 
developments for the GCV use 360 degree field-of-view and a three-man crew 
design (Defense Update, 2010).  
Sensor Range and Quality 
As technology in the electro-optical area is fast developing, nearly 
every year new and more sensitive sensors become available. With new image 
detecting software, identification and classification of unknown contacts can be 
improved or automated. As vehicle-based sensors advance, data networks also 
enable other solutions with external sensors for GCVs (Night Vision and 
Electronic Sensor Directorate NVSED, 2013).  
Another enabler for battlefield reconnaissance is the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based on ground combat vehicles. The FCS is 
designed for using UAV technology and embeds it in a network structure for real 
time targeting information. In the given scenario there is already a UAV “RAVEN” 
agent modeled so the effect of a vehicle-based UAV will be diminished even 
when additional UAVs could provide more information. The author chose to 
model the effect of close range UAVs on a vehicle by simply increasing the 
sensor capabilities of the vehicle agents. Additional studies could be conducted 
to look at the effect of micro UAV swarms on the MOEs by actually modeling 
each UAV (GlobalSecurity, 2013).  
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A relatively new improvement to the surveillance capabilities of 
ground combat systems is the use of unattended ground sensors. Here, many 
automated sensors are distributed in a certain area by hand or by artillery. These 
sensors transmit detections to the base station, which is in the ground vehicle, 
and provides for an accurate picture of the battlefield in areas beyond the reach 
of even the most sophisticated GCV sensors (Textron Defense Systems, 2013).  
Further improvements for surveillance can also be achieved by 
using the benefits of network centric warfare (NCW); NCW is the combination of 
ISR, command and control, and effectors in one information space. The idea is 
that every participant of the network has access to all information which is 
relevant for his mission. The U.S. forces use the approach of a Global 
Information Grid, which means that dispersed participants all over the world have 
access to one combined information pool. Of course, there are still many 
criticisms, uncertainties, misunderstandings, and developments that will occur 
until such a project can be successful, but right now most Western nations have 
their own version of NCW under development. In the existing force structure the 
beginning of this concept is being realized. For example, a targeting process for 
a detected air defense system in Operation Desert Storm took days. In Operation 
Iraqi Freedom it was a question of minutes due to better information networks. 
Therefore, the author chooses to implement such a “global” information system in 
the agent-based model described in this thesis. The effects can be increased 
from the current state until every Blue agent has access to all information about 
Blue and Red forces instantaneously (Alberts, 1999; Wilson, 2007).  
Main and Secondary Weapon Ranges, Precision, Penetration 
Capabilities 
A High Energy Laser (HEL) can be used in the future as the main 
or secondary weapon system, as well as an air-defense counter rocket, and anti-
artillery defense system. New developments are reaching the point where the 
HEL weapon combined with a corresponding sensor system (mostly radar) is 
small enough to be installed on ground combat vehicles. The question will be 
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how well they can perform under combat conditions which include all kinds of 
weather disturbances and electronic interference.  
In their use as main weapons, the HEL has the potential to 
accomplish a nearly 100% hit probability as all the dispersion effects for ballistic 
projectiles no longer apply. The author is able to judge this from his own 
experience as he used laser range finders on main battle tanks for 10 years, and 
the difference is only the intensity of the laser beam used. The problem is that an 
HEL needs a lot of energy, and the penetration capability decreases very quickly 
with increasing distance. As there is no solution approximated for this problem its 
use as a main weapon system is not examined in this study. The use of HEL as a 
defense weapon against rockets, airplanes, and indirect fire shells as well as 
blinding sensors is realistic in the near future. For example, Rheinmetall will start 
integrating such systems in ground vehicles in 2013 (T. Eshel, 2012a; Defense 
Update, 2011; N. Eshel, 2011).  
Rail guns are considered to be a promising new gun family for 
naval ships, and in the near future minimization efforts could make a vehicle 
equipped with a rail gun possible. Today, rail guns struggle with the same 
difficulties as laser weapons in regard to the power supply and the size of such a 
weapon. The advantage of the rail gun lies in the higher start velocity achievable 
(up to 10000m/sec), and therefore it has a nearly straight trajectory which 
dramatically increases the hit probability. Additionally, the ammunition can be 
made very small, which would enable a greater amount to be carried on a 
combat vehicle. Furthermore, the penetration capability is much greater than for 
conventional guns. Especially the penetration capability is an advantage of the 
rail gun compared to a laser weapon at long ranges. Furthermore, the 
survivability of a combat vehicle could be increased when equipped with laser 
weapons as no explosive devices must be stored onboard. 
“A prototype developed by General Atomics Electromagnetics 
system (GA-EMS) group for the Office of Naval Research has successfully 
performed initial firings at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, VA and 
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at the Army Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. The gun is designed to deliver 
significantly higher muzzle energies than ever demonstrated in a tactical relevant 
configuration. The full scale ‘Blitzer’ EM Rail Gun System is currently undergoing 
a series of full energy tests and evaluation by the Navy” (General Atomics & 
Affiliated Companies, 2012a). 
As with the HEL, a use for ground combat vehicles within the next 
couple of years is not yet being considered as the problems with their size for 
electric support and the gun itself are not solved. In contrast to the laser systems, 
rail guns already raise some theoretical considerations related to their 
implementation in a ground vehicle. For example, BAE pointed out that their new 
hybrid propulsion system would produce enough electricity to add laser or rail 
gun weapons to the GCV. Although this statement seems questionable, rail guns 
will be used in the near future as main weapons onboard U.S. ships. So, even 
though they are not a realistic option until the next decade, the theoretical 
implications of such a weapon system will be modeled as an upper bound for 
main weapon performance (T. Eshel, 2012b; General Atomics & Affiliated 
Companies, 2012b). 
Another issue to be addressed is the addition of secondary weapon 
systems like a mortar, automatic grenade launchers, or heavy machine guns. 
The modeled agents already have a variety of secondary weapons. The benefit 
of such weapons is using the higher firing rates and the greater effect of indirect 
fire against covered targets. As MANA does not distinguish between cover from 
indirect or direct fire, the benefits of these weapons cannot be exactly modeled in 
contrast to direct fire guns. An indirect approach to the issue is to adjust the hit 
and kill properties for covered targets. As the scenario used in this thesis 
assumes air superiority for the Blue forces, advanced secondary air defense 
weapons are not considered, and the absence of enemy air assets would make 
no difference in the results.  
One of the lessons of asymmetric warfare is the need for non-lethal 
weapons or weapons which are able to destroy certain enemy assets without 
 18 
causing collateral damage. This field is the classical area of electromagnetic 
warfare (EW), which has been mainly used for disturbing an enemy’s 
communication abilities. New technologies like jammers for protection against 
radio controlled IEDs are just the start of a variety of energy based weapons. 
Although the field is still wide open for new ideas, there is at least one already 
under development and field testing: microwave weapons. The potential for this 
kind of weapon is that it has the capability to destroy electronic devices without 
destroying the environment. Besides this capability, microwave weapons can 
also cause pain in humans without actually inflicting long-term damage. The 
aerial deny system of Raytheon or the missiles tests with Counter-electronics 
High-powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) of the Air Force 
are examples of such weapon systems. For the given scenario the traditional 
effect of EW on communications is modeled, as no other non-lethal weapon is 
needed. EW defense is also not part of the model. 
It is unusual to find communications and information management 
under lethality. The author decided to summarize them under lethality to 
emphasize the influence of communication and data exchange for fire 
coordination, targeting information, and allocation, as well as processing this 
information for the crews of combat systems. New software systems, human 
factors-oriented design, and advanced data exchange rates increase situational 
awareness, help to avoid fratricide, accelerate target detection and engagement, 
and ultimately increase the lethality of the system and the whole deployed force, 
so that the “combined arms” concept can be utilized (Hudson, 2012; Axe, 2012). 
“To date, however, the networks have not been able to provide the 
necessary information in a complete and timely manner. The existing Blue Force 
Tracking and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below systems have 
worked to some extent but are not sufficient to allow complete reliance on them” 
(Kempinski & Murphy, 2012). With advanced technologies it might be able to 
achieve the desired effects of superior situational awareness, and so they will be 
modeled in MANA.  
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b. Mobility 
Speed on Different Surfaces /Acceleration 
New kinds of engine systems, especially electric systems, offer new 
possibilities. Hydraulic electric propulsion is advertised as one of the most 
beneficial new developments for future GCVs, and it is planned to be used by the 
BAE contractor. Not only the reliability of the drive line system can be increased 
through the reduction of moving parts; there are also possible alternatives in the 
location of the engine and the power supply. One advantage for an infantry 
carrier could be that a “dual sponson engine design clears more space in the 
fighting compartment, while minimizing the volume under armor, thus saving 
weight of about three tons. It also enables a two-seat crew compartment, for 
driver and commander seated side-by side” (Ahearn, 2012). So carrying capacity 
could increase or more armor protection could be achieved with the same weight 
as the volume under the armor is reduced. 
Hydraulic electric propulsion is said to save 10 to 20 % of fuel for 
the same vehicle, and much more important it is able to provide the necessary 
torque immediately so the acceleration of vehicles is faster. As beneficial as 
these advantages are, the most significant benefit is its design which generates 
much more electrical energy. Electric energy is considered as a main “bottle 
neck” for future weapons and protection systems for ground combat vehicles. 
Last but not least, range and speed could also be increased by this technology 
as electric propulsion is advertised as more energy efficient and able to produce 
a higher torque than combustion engines (Ahearn, 2012; T. Eshel, 2012c).  
c. Protection/Survivability 
The protection or survivability of a ground vehicle is not only 
dependent on the size and the structure of its armor. Many other factors also 
contribute to the overall protection of a system. The different layers of protection 




Figure 3.  Scheme of the different phases which  comprise the protection of a 
vehicle: “Survivability onion.” (From Kempinski & Murphy, 2012) 
The first zone shown in Figure 3 is a preemptive kill zone. If long-
range systems are able to kill the enemy before it gets within reach this adds up 
to the increased survivability of the considered vehicle. This can be 
accomplished by adding a long range, mostly indirect weapon and the 
corresponding sensor base on the protected GCV or by implementing the force 
structure with such long-range weapons. The latter is called a “system of 
systems” consideration and can lead to the examination of the right force mix for 
a mission. In current deployments the availability of long-range indirect fire 
support is a tactical consideration. The model takes that fact into account in 
providing indirect fire through M109 A6 Paladins and adding an organic, indirect 
fire weapon on the GCV (Rheinmetall Defence, 2013a).  
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Avoid Being Detected/Concealment 
New technologies promise to drastically improve the concealment 
and stealth capabilities of ground combat systems. The most often used 
detection sensors in ground combat during day and night time are thermal based 
as armored vehicles and humans produce a lot of heat. Therefore, there are 
systems under development to reduce the thermal signature of combat vehicles. 
An example is the ADAPTIV system of the BAE systems. ADAPTIV works by 
using lightweight hexagonal pixels which are electrically powered by the base 
vehicle. “The pixels are individually heated and cooled using commercially 
available semi-conducting technology”(BAE Systems, 2013). 
Once installed the system promises to provide combat vehicles with 
the following improvements: 
• The ability to blend into natural surroundings; 
• The ability to mimic natural objects and other vehicles; 
• A significantly reduced detection range; and 
• Friend – Foe identification 
The capability of the ADAPTIV system on thermal sight detection systems is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  The picture at left shows a vehicle with no ADAPTIV system; the 
middle picture shows the effect of the concealment through ADAPTIV; 
and the right picture shows the capability of the ADAPTIV system for 
deception as it simulates the signature of a car. 
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This technology alone cannot provide total cover from detection as 
there are unresolved issues with heated exhaust gases, noise, dust, or simply 
detection through normal vision at daytime and light intensifier at night. If only the 
heat signature can be diminished it already provides huge advantages in 
detection ranges at night, and there are also new developments to further 
conceal ground combat vehicles in the other areas. A combination of the 
ADAPTIV system with an electric engine to reduce the noise and common 
camouflage seems to be an excellent mix to avoid detection.  
Avoid Being Hit: “Soft and Hard Kill” Systems 
Another contributor for survivability is “hard kill” protection 
systems. These systems detect and destroy incoming projectiles of all kinds. 
One possible system is an HEL weapon. Another major development tree is APS 
(Active Protection System). For example, the Israeli NAMER infantry carrier is 
designed to use the integrated Iron Fist Active Protection System currently under 
development. The different processing steps conducted by a “hard kill” system 
are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Sequence of events and minimum required distance for a generic 
hard-kill Active Protection System (From Haug & Wagner, 2013). 
The German Rheinmetall Defence Company successfully 
conducted tests against projectiles fired from ranges fewer than 20 meters, as 
shown in Figure 6. Their system uses sensors “mounted on the protected 
platform, to detect potential threats, measure distance and trajectory, providing 
the fire control system with data for calculation of engagement plans. When a 
threat is identified as imminent, an explosive projectile interceptor is launched 
toward it” (Rheinmetall Defence, 2013b). It is likely that future combat vehicles 
will be equipped with such systems. They are similar to reactive armor, but are 
more capable and drastically reduce the threat of hitting bystanders.  Interaction 
with each other and similar systems like radar and jammers are still not well 
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known. There is a possibility that they interfere with each other and so decrease 
the protection effect (Kempinski & Murphy, 2012; Rheinmetall Defence, 2013b; 
Defense Update, 2009; Pressebox, 2011; General Dynamics Armament and 
Technical Products, 2013).  
 
Figure 6.  German ADS system with incoming missile and ranges for detection 
(dark grey) and destruction (light grey). 
As the effectiveness of such protection systems is difficult to model 
in MANA, the author chooses to decrease the hit probability of enemy anti-tank 
weapon systems on the GCVs modeled.   
Nearly as important as the “hard kill” are the “soft kill” systems. 
“Soft kill” systems are designed to prevent incoming missiles from hitting the 
target without destroying the missile. In this class, there are already a high 
number of systems operating on modern ground combat vehicles. The most 
common ones are launchers for fog grenades, which conceal the vehicle from 
incoming missiles or flare systems and jammers, which are able to mislead 
advanced intelligence projectiles. Here, a steady progress has been achieved. 
For example, Rheinmetall developed the Rosy_L–Rapid Obscuring System 
which is able to conceal even a driving vehicle with sustained fog. As MANA is 
able to give each system a certain concealment rate, the current concealment of 





New developments for armor must be examined as it is the most 
well-known contributor to survivability. 
“There are two general classes of armor: passive and reactive. 
Passive systems work by stopping the projectile through the material properties 
of the armor components alone. Reactive systems work by inducing an explosion 
or other response in the armor to reduce the lethality of the projectile by 
disruption or deflection. Types of passive armor include bulk armor, modular 
armor, slat armor, and hull shaping. Types of reactive armor include explosive 
reactive armor and electromagnetic armor” (Kempinski & Murphy, 2012).  
For passive armor the use of new materials, especially composite 
material, decreases the penetration possibilities of existing weapons. For 
example, CPS Technologies, a producer of advanced Metal Matrix Composites 
(MMC), is unveiling armor grade materials enabling armor designers to produce 
ballistic and blast mitigating materials with greater strength at lower specific 
weights (T. Eshel, 2012d). 
The effects of enhanced armor against different kinds of weapons 
cannot be predicted before extensive tests are conducted, but it is reasonable to 
assume an improved weight/protection ratio by at least 20%. It must be realized 
that the use of advanced passive and active armor will increase the cost of a 
GCV drastically and adding armor can also influence many other performance 
factors. “Ceramic armor materials can halve the weight per unit of protected area 
of armor compared with the same metric for steel, but they cost 4 to 12 times as 
much to achieve that benefit” (Kempinski & Murphy, 2012). Increased costs are 
the reason why most modern GCV try to implement modular armor packages in 
their development program to adjust the armor according to the threat 
environment (T. Eshel, 2012d).  
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There are additional ways to increase the survivability of the crew 
and the system. Most of the systems are designed to minimize the damage when 
the armor is penetrated, while others dealing with a special non ballistic threat 
and, again, another kind to further enhance lethality or survivability. Some 
examples are: 
• Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) protection capability 
• Fire suppression systems 
• Ammunition compartment separated from the crew 
• Seats Designed to Absorb Impact of IED/mines 
• Remotely controlled turret 
• Hunter/killer combat techniques 
• Advanced training simulator 
• Tactical doctrine 
• Evasive maneuver to avoid engagement or to avoid getting hit 
There is no question that the items listed are important; all are 
contents of a balanced system design for combat vehicles and all exist for 
current combat vehicles. Improvements in these areas will further enhance the 
mentioned effects and therefore increase the MANA model parameter like firing 
rate, armor, detection rate and hit probability.  
Robotics 
The implementation of an autonomous robotic system could 
influence the current face of the battlefield in many different ways. The possible 
benefits of such as system include the following: 
• Casualty reduction; 
• Improved mission effectiveness--robots for reconnaissance, 
convoy, support, force protection free soldiers for higher-level 
tasks; 
• Improved situational awareness from unmanned air and ground 
vehicle scouts; 
• Seamless integration of manned and unmanned assets into the 
battle team; and 
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• Reduced logistics workload, increased focus on mission. 
The current systems under development have the potential to 
totally change the force structure. So could it be possible to use many fewer 
performing robot systems, instead of fewer higher performing manned systems, 
to achieve the same goals more efficiently. As the scope of this thesis is to help 
increase the performance of ground systems in a joint and combined 
environment this aspect will be left to further studies. The MANA scenario used 
works with a fixed number of systems and will not be able to determine a tradeoff 
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III. MANA V AS COMBAT SIMULATION SOFTWARE 
A. WHY MANA V 
One important decision of research involving combat simulation is to 
choose the right simulation software. For this thesis, the author chose Map-
Aware Non-Uniform Automata-Vector (MANA-V). MANA-V is a time-step, 
stochastic modeling environment developed by the Defence Technology Agency 
(DTA) of New Zealand, and it has been chosen for several reasons. 
First, MANA-V is a complex adaptive system intended to mimic real-world 
factors of combat. It is a low resolution model regarding physical aspects of 
modeling combat events like shooting, armor penetration, probability of hitting, 
and so on. Many real-world factors are accumulated into a single value. For 
example, if a tank is being shot at with a particular weapon the resulting damage 
depends on the armor thickness at the impact area, the angle the projectile has, 
the range from which it is fired, the kind of projectile, and so on. MANA simplifies 
these circumstances in a single range-dependent kill probability.  As this can be 
seen as disadvantageous at first glance, it keeps high transparency in the model. 
Therefore, MANA is an excellent choice if the purpose of the model is not to get 
an optimal attack strategy for a certain weapon system, but to look for the most 
influential factors or interactions on defined MOEs, which is the case in this 
thesis. Another advantage resulting from the low resolution is that it allows 
running multiple replications due to lower computational times and therefore 
enables the analyst to use design of experiment and data farming techniques in 
an effective way (McIntosh, 2007). 
Second, MANA is an agent-based simulation, which allows the agents to 
react on their own sensor inputs. It is not necessary to prescript the behavior of 
the agents which allows for a great variance in outcomes comparable to real 
human behavior. This enables the analyst to find and study unlikely outcomes 
and draw conclusions from these outcomes. To do this, the seed which 
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represents the random values used by the software, has to be stored, and an 
interesting run can then be repeated by the analyst. The author found that the 
seed for the command line runs on the cluster computer used was not identical to 
the seed used at the graphical user interface (GUI). Thanks to the advice of Ms. 
Mary McDonald and Mr. McIntosh of the New Zealand developer team this “bug” 
could be fixed during the study. 
A third advantage of MANA is that it provides an easy-to-use GUI and has 
a rapid learning curve in modeling agents and building a scenario. The graphical 
representation of the battle allows the analyst close control of the agent behavior, 
high transparency of cause and reaction, and fast changes of input parameters. 
Furthermore, MANA is capable of data farming, which means that it 
enables the use of high dimensional design of experiments. It is possible to 
create a certain design of ranges for input parameter and run them with a 
specified number of replications. It is even possible to automatically run different 
replications with a certain parameter (for example, a weapon system) enabled or 
disabled. As variance is brought in by the agent’s behavior and random events it 
is an inherited part of the output. Therefore, it is not only possible to look for an 
optimal solution, but also to find a robust one. This is essential as every combat 
simulation, regardless how detailed it is, is not a replica of reality and is logically 
error prone.   
In sum, MANA is exactly the software an analyst needs to get quick 
insights and find out major influential factors and dependencies as it focuses on 
main details. For exact numbers or detailed answers a more physically based 
model or real-world experiments are more applicable. 
For a detailed exploration of the capabilities of the MANA-V software the 
author refers readers to the MANA 4 and MANA V user manuals (McIntosh, 
2007; McIntosh, 2009). 
 31 
B. DRAWBACKS 
As stated before, MANA is a low-resolution model and has several 
disadvantages. The ones which influence the purpose of the thesis must be 
mentioned and are stated in the following paragraphs. 
Sensors 
MANA uses two types of sensors: simple sensors and advanced. The 
simple sensor is a “cookie cutter” sensor for which the user can specify one 
detection range and one classification range as well as a sensor aperture in 
degrees. The advanced sensor has the same features, but it allows also for 
probabilistic detection rates and probabilities of classification. Therefore, the user 
can model a realistic detection behavior within the advanced mode. 
Ground combat vehicles usually have magnifying sensors for their main 
weapons, which limit the field-of-view to small segments. These sensors are then 
moved in a tactical assigned direction to scan larger areas. For example, each 
Abrams tank in a platoon is assigned a 60 degree angle to scan with the main 
thermal sight (10 degree aperture) when the platoon is moving (Figure 7). MANA 
is theoretically able to simulate this behavior as it has the option to give agents a 
facing direction and to assign a slew rate in a sector. Unfortunately, this feature 
does not work as well when enemy targets get very close.  
 
Figure 7.  Field-of-view for an Abrams tank thermal sight. 
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In reality, it is one of the greatest weaknesses of armored vehicles that 
they have dead spots in their proximity—especially in urban combat. In MANA 
the problem is even worse as simulation tests showed that the vehicle agents are 
unable to react realistically in close combat, and they drive by enemies at close 
ranges without facing the sensors in the enemy’s direction. Agents are unable to 
detect enemies even when they see them at longer distances.  
To create a more realistic behavior the author chose to use 360 degree 
sensors and adjusted the detection rate. For very close enemies, vehicles get a 
“cookie cutter” sensor with 360 degrees to simulate the possibility of crew 
members looking out of the vehicle hatches. In reality this is not always possible, 
especially if the vehicle is under attack. 
Armor 
The setting for armor in MANA version 5.0 is not detailed enough. When 
an armored vehicle is hit, the probability of getting damaged or destroyed 
depends on the ability of the projectile to penetrate the armor at the impact 
location. Whether penetration takes place depends on various factors such as 
the shooter’s distance from the target, angle of impact, the target’s armor 
thickness and angle of attack on the impact location, and finally the penetration 
ability of the projectile against the special armor class of the target. To make it 
more complicated many modern ground vehicles also have a variety of active 
defense systems like a smoke grenade discharger or flares. These kinds of 
systems are also only effective against one class of projectile, such as flares 
against heat seeking missiles.  
In MANA it was only possible to set a single penetration value for a 
weapon and a single armor thickness to an agent. This means that an anti-tank 
missile with an average penetration capability of 999 mm RHA (= rolled 
homogeneous armor equivalent) has no chance of penetrating a 1000mm RHA 
armored tank. High resolution combat simulation divides vehicles in different 
zones with different armor thickness, calculates the probability of hitting a zone, 
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and then calculates the probability of penetrating the armor in the zone given a 
hit and taking all other parameters into consideration. Even when the armor is 
penetrated, there are different possibilities of damage results. 
For the purpose of the thesis it was sufficient to combine these factors and 
approximate the penetration capability of the weapon by a normal distribution 
with a user chosen mean and deviation to achieve the desired resolution. 
Changes in the MANA software were done by the New Zealand developer team 
according to the recommendations of the author. 
C. SUMMARY 
MANA has the ability to model realistic behavior and has proven to 
possess the tools for approximating physical effects of high resolution software 
through indirect means. This leads to quick insights and covers relationships 
between battle influential factors. As MANA is designed for this purpose, it only 
adds necessary physical details. It will be necessary to use a higher resolution 
model for approximating the specifications of a special ground combat vehicle 
sufficiently close after the results of the MANA model, and first field tests show 
the basic relationships.  
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IV. SCENARIO 
The modeled scenario is discussed in this chapter. First, it is explained 
why the model fits the purpose of the study and then how it is modeled. Finally, 
the discussion covers what could not be addressed due to software restrictions.  
A. SELECTION CRITERIA 
Currently, military doctrine divides the deployment environment in 
peacekeeping operations (low battle intensity), irregular combat (asymmetric 
warfare), and conventional combat (major conflict between militarily developed 
states). For a specification scenario it is important to contain the predominant 
types of threat for GCVs in these deployment types. These types are according 
to Kempinski & Murphy (2012): 
• Small weapons and unguided mortars for peacekeeping; 
• Rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, 
explosively formed projectiles, and unguided mortars for irregular 
warfare; and, 
• Tank rounds and large antitank weapons in conventional combat.  
For this thesis, the scenario selection is based on following additional 
considerations: 
• It must be a realistic battlefield environment, which can be used for 
the full spectrum of warfare. 
• It must contain the most advanced major ground vehicles in use 
and also the most likely joint combat-arm systems.  
• The terrain must be challenging for ground combat vehicles and 
allow short to long range combat situations. 
• It must be applicable for use at a reinforced company level to keep 
the runtime for MANA at a reasonable magnitude. 
• The scenario should be designed to inflict heavy damage, including 
mission failure, on the BLUE forces. This is a prerequisite to see 
the improvement the new system can achieve. 
• The scenario should have been widely used, should be officially 
approved and should be tested with other combat simulation 
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software or war gaming to achieve a higher level of confidence in 
the results.  
• The force structure must address the requirement of containing the 
most likely mix of combat systems according to actual doctrine. 
This is important, as the force mixture can strengthen or diminish 
the relationships between the factors of interest. For example, if 
someone tests only battle tanks against battle tanks and he would 
examine the effect of giving one side superior range this would lead 
to a significant advantage for this side. If both sides have long 
range indirect fire systems available, the casualty rate of the 
upgraded side would increase even when the tank ranges are 
adjusted as in the first case. Therefore, the scenario should contain 
the most likely force structure to capture the effects of the 
corresponding interactions. 
The chosen scenario framework is taken from a division level U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) scenario called MLS1 (Brown et al., 
2009). This scenario contains the attack of a reinforced mechanized infantry 
company of the 7/HBCT (heavy brigade combat team) against parts of a 
mechanized battalion based on a fictive scenario taking place in the state of 
Colorado. A tactical overview of the scenario is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Division level CONOPS of the chosen TRADOC scenario. 
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The U.S. forces are equipped with Bradley A3 infantry vehicles and 
supported by Abrams M1A2 Sep battle tanks. All BLUE combat support units are 
taken from the scenario description.  
The Bradley Company and the enemy provide only a basic scenario used 
as a reference. The real purpose of the simulation is to analyze the influence of a 
new ground fighting vehicle on the defined measurement of performances in 
comparison to the existing systems. Main measurements of performance are the 
following: 
• MOE1: Own casualties 
• MOE2: Enemy casualties 
• MOE3: Time for reaching the mission objective 
• MOE4: Casualty ratio =  𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑
𝐵𝐿𝑈𝐸 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 
• MOE 5: If Bradleys are substituted with future GCV, 
GCV destroyed and BLUE infantry lost 
• MOE 6: If M1 Abrams are substituted with future GCV, 
only GCV destroyed 
• MOE 7: BLUE victories (conditions defined in Chapter V) 
Notice that for an infantry carrier the number of infantry killed is an 
important MOE as infantry losses can occur while the infantry is mounted or 
dismounted. In the mounted case it is the task of the carrier to protect the infantry 
as they are not able to fight. In the dismounted case the carrier has to provide 
additional firepower for its dismounted squad. So in both cases the performance 
of the carrier directly influences the casualty rate of the infantry, and therefore it 
is a valid MOE for the carrier. 
To achieve tactical insights, the properties of the BLUE agents’ modeled 
weapon systems and their behavior should be as realistic as possible. The 
following section lists the modeled systems and some of the detailed modeling 
considerations. Other physical properties like ranges, used weapons, sensors, 
equipment and their references are available in electronic format at the NPS 
SEED Center (for more information, contact Professor Thomas Lucas). The used 
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sources for the set values are the TRADOC scenario itself, the Global Security 
data base, the Information Handling Services (IHS) Jane's catalog, the 
Federation of American Scientists homepage, official field manuals and doctrine 
papers, and, if no other source was available, Wikipedia. 
B. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES FOR BLUE AGENTS 
1. Bradley M2A3 
The main ground combat vehicle for the scenario is the Bradley M2A3. 
The Bradley is an infantry carrying ground combat vehicle with a crew of three 
and is capable of transporting up to seven additional infantry soldiers. As MANA 
is only capable of specifying one value for average armor thickness per agent, 
the author chooses a value according to his military knowledge. An infantry 
carrier offers good protection against small and medium arms, but is usually 
penetrated by anti-tank missiles and main battle tank cannons. The sensor 
settings for the Bradley are according to the basic considerations in Chapter III. 
So, it is possible for the Bradley crew to look out of the hatches and detect 
enemy agents at close distances at 360 degrees. These settings must be 
adjusted if urban combat is modeled with the Bradley agent. 
Logistical considerations of ammunition and fuel are modeled, but due to 
the duration and intensity of the battle have little influence. All Bradleys have a 
100 % reliable communication link from and to the company headquarters. 
2. Bradley Infantry Squad 
For simplicity and computational run time the seven infantry agents in a 
Bradley are modeled uniformly. This means all infantry agents are able to use all 
squad weapons with a reduced fire rate. The ammunition is available for all 
agents in the infantry squad. For example, if there are five M4 with 250 rounds 
each in the squad, the ammunition of the squad is 5 x 250 = 1250. If one infantry 
agent is killed, the squad loses 1/7 of its firepower. This aggregation does not 
affect the basic relationships this thesis is designed to discover.  
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As infantry is able to conceal itself much better than vehicles, the agents 
have a terrain independent concealment factor. This factor is lowered when the 
infantry use their weapons.  
The infantry communication links are only established with their 
corresponding infantry carrier. They are unable to reach the company 
headquarters directly. 
As mechanized infantry is usually deployed within the “combined arms 
concept,” the BLUE forces have access to the following assets. 
3. Abrams M1A2 SEP 
The most common support weapon systems for mechanized infantry are 
main battle tanks, as they provide the necessary superior firepower and follow 
similar doctrines. In the given scenario, the heavy tank component is represented 
by Abrams M1A2 SEP tanks. This is the latest upgrade of the Abrams tank 
versions. As it is also possible that a future ground combat vehicle will be 
developed as a battle tank-like system, and the German army plans to start an 
acquisition project of a new major battle tank system (Reuters, 2012), the thesis 
will also focus on analyzing this kind of vehicle. 
The armor of the Abrams tank represents state-of-the-art protection in the 
front area, but the Bradley has different values for the roof or mine protection. 
The Abrams is also equipped with active protection such as a smoke grenade 
launcher or radar warning systems. MANA combines these to a normal 
distribution with a mean and a standard deviation. As before, the author chose to 
adjust for this fact according to his own military experience and the found 
specified hardware values. The MANA values are set to represent the fact that 
the Abrams tank has a good survivability against most anti-tank systems and is 
normally not penetrated by older battle tank systems or small arms fire. 
The armor penetration capability of the 120 mm main gun is heavily 
dependent on the range between target and gun, but due to restrictions of the 
 40 
MANA software the lower penetration at long ranges can only be taken into 
calculations by a lower hit probability at these ranges. 
The sensor considerations are exact the same as those noted in Chapter 
III or for the Bradley vehicles.  
Logistical considerations of ammunition and fuel are modeled, but due to 
the duration and intensity of the battle have little influence. The Abrams have a 
100 % reliable communication link from and to the company headquarters. 
4. DQ 11 RAVEN UAV 
The RAVEN UAV is a shoulder launched reconnaissance UAV, which is 
capable of detecting personnel and vehicles and sending the information in real-
time to a command post. The detection probability depends on many factors like 
weather, concealment, type of target, daytime, equipped sensors, and flight 
attitude. In the given scenario, the sensor of the UAV distinguishes between 
vehicles and infantry targets with different effectiveness. 
The RAVEN in the scenario is controlled by battalion headquarters. 
Therefore, the information has a delay of five minutes to reach the company 
commander. The endurance is set to 90 minutes before the RAVEN returns to 
refuel. The ground unit of the RAVEN is not moving during the whole scenario so 
the UAV’s “time over target” will decrease over time due to fewer times over 
target. Indirect fire support becomes available, if the RAVEN spots enemy troop 
concentration with a delay of 10 minutes. If the RAVEN spots an enemy it stays 
at the enemy position until it loses contact or refill is necessary. To decrease the 
probability of the RAVEN being shot down—as it unrealistically flies exactly to the 
enemy position and therefore in the enemy effective combat range—its 
concealment rate is set to nearly invisible. The UAV has a communication link to 
the Battalion HQ which is 100% reliable. The modeled UAV has a 360 degree 
view. The (in reality) restricted field-of-view for the UAV is taken into 
consideration by adjusting the detection rate. 
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5. Close Air Support through APACHE 64D Attack Helicopters 
The BLUE forces have the support of two Apache attack helicopters in a 
covering force role. The Apache attack helicopter has a number of 
countermeasures and is very maneuverable which makes it hard to kill, and the 
helicopter has proven to be very resistant against enemy fire—especially small 
arms—even without armor. As it is not possible to model these physical 
properties directly in MANA, an “Apache” can take two hits before it is shot down. 
The Apaches have an endurance of two hours. After returning to a Forward 
Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) they are rearmed and refueled, but they are 
not repaired. An undamaged Apache returns to battle after 20 minutes in the 
FARP. Empty weapons reload automatically within 40 minutes. Damaged 
helicopters immediately return to base. After 30 minutes the damaged Apache 
becomes available again, but the next hit kills it. The modeled behavior is to 
attack the enemy at long-range distances, if they detect them and stay out of the 
reach of small arms fire. The Apaches always follow the ground forces or fly 
before them as reconnaissance unless they get enemy target information by their 
own sensors or via communication link. Then, they engage the nearest targets 
detected, including scouting out unknown detections. 
6. Indirect Fire Support from 155 mm Howitzer 
Indirect fire in the scenario can be requested by the troops on the ground, 
can be triggered by UAV information or by other reconnaissance means (see 
below). The fire request is executed whenever a threat threshold of 10 is 
exceeded. This means that the howitzer—like real artillery—do not open fire on 
single targets like an infantry man, but only on high value targets and groups of 
detected enemies. The amount of fire for the company is limited to four rounds 
per minute for three minutes with a break of 20 minutes between the next salvos. 
The howitzer fire support is represented by one stationary agent. The howitzer 
has unlimited ammunition. It is possible that the indirect fire kills its own troops as 
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there is a three- to five-minute delay in the targeting information depending on 
the target information source. 
7. Indirect Information 
Normally, a lot of information is provided by higher headquarters before 
and while an attack is executed. The source of this information can be a satellite, 
human intelligence, or signal intelligence. To model this effect, the company 
headquarters agent detects enemies at a low rate on the whole battlefield and 
provides this information to the BLUE agents. As the information of higher 
headquarters must normally be confirmed by other forces, the information is 
provided nearly exclusively as unknowns who lead to attraction from BLUE air 
assets which then do reconnaissance and classification of the enemy. 
C. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES FOR RED AGENTS 
The RED agents are based on the enemy given in the TRADOC scenario, 
but are adjusted to use the most modern versions of the given systems. The 
main reason for the adjustment is to test any future system against the most 
sophisticated enemy known and not against systems which will be no longer be 
in use when the GCV is deployed. Another reason for the RED force upgrade is 
that RED is supposed to inflict heavy casualties on the given BLUE force. This is 
necessary to measure the improvements of the new systems. 
1. RED Infantry 
The major “system” of the RED force is the infantry squad, as the 
TRADOC scenario uses an infantry battalion as the RED force. The author 
makes the assumption that the enemy infantry has equal qualities according to 
training, motivation, command and control, as well as leadership skill as do the 
BLUE forces. Only the weapons are different.  These infantry squads are 
equipped with the most advanced weapons from possible “hostile” states. For 
example, each squad has 2xRPG-29 anti-tank grenade launchers.   
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These infantry squads have also special heavy weapon teams attached. 
As additional long-range anti-tank capability they have MILAN anti-tank missiles. 
For augmented indirect support against infantry enemies RED has 60 mm 
mortars and AGS-30 weapons (heavy grenade launcher) attached. 
2. T90M Tanks 
The T-90M tanks are modeled to have the most sophisticated enemy tank 
system available. They are not part of the TRADOC scenario, but engaging with 
them allows a good measurement of performance for a future ground combat 
system. 
Lacking exact data about weapon accuracy and armor for the T90M tanks, 
the author assumed the same qualities as those of the Abrams M1A2 SEP.  
Additionally, the T-90M is equipped with many active protection measures like 
jammer, radar alert, dazzle paintings, etc. Therefore, they are modeled with a 
concealment rate of 0.2. 
The armor penetration capability of the 125 mm main gun is heavily 
dependent on the range between target and gun, but this can only be taken into 
calculations by a lower hit probability. The T-90M has REFLEKS M/AT-11 anti-
tank missiles as an additional main weapon system which gives it a superior 
range against the BLUE ground forces. The sensor systems apply the same 
considerations, as stated in Chapter III. 
3. SA-18 SAM (Surface to Air Missile) 
With assumed BLUE air superiority, it is likely that RED uses man-portable 
air defense systems (MANPADs) to shoot down BLUE aircraft as they can hide 
easily in a mountainous area. The TRADOC scenario contains this kind of 
weapon for the RED forces, but the author chose to upgrade them to the SA-18. 
The SA-18 is a modern surface to air missile (SAM) similar to most of the SA 
family weapon systems and has the ability to shoot down even modern fighter 
jets. 
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4. 120 mm Mortar 
In the scenario, the 120 mm mortar is used as the main indirect fire 
support for the RED side. The mortar modeled has unlimited ammunition and a 
reload rate of 10 min. The mortar depends on fire requests from other units and 
has no known sensors. It is possible that the 120 mm mortar causes fratricide. 
5. Antitank Mine TM 83/IED 
As IEDs are one of the most lethal and common weapons in asymmetric 
warfare they must be taken into consideration. For symmetric warfare the same 
applies to antitank mines as they are comparably cheap and available in high 
numbers.  Mines and IEDs have a high concealment capability depending on the 
operator skills. In the given scenario the concealment is modeled as the highest 
rate before becoming totally invisible, which represents a very skillful mining. 
The mine/IED agents used in the scenario represents not only antitank 
mines, but also anti-personnel mines to prohibit removal by infantry. Therefore, 
they have a simple sensor with a radius of 100 meters for mines and 50 meters 
for IEDs. After a mine/IED is activated or detected, the position of the 
minefield/IED is known by BLUE, and it can be avoided. To model the effect that 
the minefield/IED has become useless or even cleared, the mine/IED can be 
attacked by BLUE agents and is removed in this way. If the mine/IED explodes, 
the agent disables itself after one shot. As destroyed mines/IEDs do not count as 
casualties, they conceal themselves after shooting.  
Most modern ground combat vehicles have relatively effective mine 
protection. The problem is that it is much easier for the attacker to increase the 
penetration strength of the mine/IED than it is for the defender to increase his 
protection. In the modeled scenario the mines are designed for taking out the 
most armored vehicles of BLUE (Abrams tanks) with a 50% change. So, if a less 
protected agent is hit by a mine, it is usually killed. 
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6. RED Communication 
The RED force command and control structure is different in the three 
modeled battle phases. This is explained in detail later in this chapter (see “Battle 
Modeling”). 
D. AGENT BEHAVIOR  
The most important agents‒infantry, main battle tanks, Bradleys—have 
the following states (which equals their behavior) modeled: 
1. Infantry 
Infantry soldiers, including those carrying heavy weapons like anti-tank 
missiles, have the following states modeled:  
“Default:” RED infantry starts with a very high concealment factor 
corresponding to the fact that they have prepared and camouflaged positions. 
BLUE infantry has a lower concealment, but as they take cover immediately 
when they dismount the value is still high compared to a vehicle. 
“Taken shot at:” Whenever infantry is shooting they can be detected more 
easily and their position can be located. To model this fact the concealment is 
reduced after the infantry opens fire. 
“Shot at:” Whenever infantry gets shot at it takes cover. Therefore, their 
concealment is modeled very high which corresponds to a low probability of 
getting hit. When the infantry has taken cover, it is not able to use its weapons. 
This represents the effect of “suppression.” 
“Reached alternative waypoint:” Whenever BLUE infantry is dismounted 
and its carrier is destroyed, the BLUE infantry will try to get to the final waypoint 
on its own. 
2. Main Battle Tanks 
“Default:” BLUE tanks will follow their waypoints if no enemy is detected, 
but will also stay close to the Bradley to protect them. RED tanks do not move at 
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all before the BLUE forces reach a minefield, but then they start a counterattack, 
which represents their mission as the RED reserve force. 
“Enemy contact:” If BLUE or RED tanks detect enemies themselves or get 
the information via radio, they will go into engagement mode which means they 
move with a slow rate toward the enemy and take cover. Tanks will stay at a 
certain distance from the enemy and use their main guns as they are not 
designed for close combat. 
3. Bradleys 
“Default:” Infantry carriers will follow their waypoints with the infantry 
mounted. If enemies are detected a Bradley will stay on the route, or when the 
detection is close, engage the enemy.  
“Shot at:” As soon as the enemy opens fire at a Bradley it dismounts the 
infantry and provides cover fire for its infantry squad. In reality, this might not 
always be the case, but the agents cannot distinguish between fire that 
endangers the vehicle and fire that could penetrate the armor.  
“De-embussed Children:” When the enemy is destroyed or no longer 
detected, the Bradley agents will search for additional enemies. After 30 minutes, 
they mount their infantry again and proceed with the mission. 
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4. Agent Summary 
After many tests with different force levels, the author chose to use 
following agents shown in Tables 1and 2 to achieve the desired effect of about 
30 to 50% BLUE loses which leads to some RED victories. 
Table 1.   Overview of BLUE Forces: modeled types of forces, number of 
MANA agents of each type, and represented manpower. 
Reinforced 2nd Comp 1/28 Mech 
Inf Bat; 7./HBCT; 7./ArmyDiv 
(Department of the Army, 1998) 







4 x Bradley M2A3 12 3 4 
4 x Bradley infantry 28 1 28 
Platoon Abrams SEP M1A2 16 4 4 
2 x AH64-D attack helicopter 4 2 2 
M109A6 4 4 1 
RQ11 RAVEN UAV 0 0 1 
BLUE_Company_HQ 0 0 1 
 sum 64  41 
 
Table 2.   Overview of RED Forces  
Parts of reinforced Mech 
Inf Btl 








3 x infantry squad 48 1 48 
Platoon T 90 tanks 16 4 4 
Mines/IED 0 0 6 
SAM-18 2 1 2 
Mrs 60 mm 3 1 3 
Mrs 2S12 120 mm 5 5 1 
AGS 30 4 1 4 
3 x MILAN 6 1 6 
RED_Company_HQ 0 0 1 




E. BATTLEFIELD FACTORS 
As important as physical properties of agents are, the “other battlefield 
factors” are most influential for explaining historical battle outcomes.  
1. Battlefield Factors Not Used in the Scenario 
Both time of day and weather are major contributors to the performance of 
weapons systems. For example, a superior night vision of a weapon system 
could give one side a decisive advantage that would not be the case during 
daytime.  
Weather has also proven to be a decisive factor as it affects many 
physical properties of weapon systems and soldiers in terms of detection ranges, 
movement rates, orientation capability or the availability of air assets. Therefore, 
the influence of both factors should be considered in the specification process, 
but both factors are not readily available in MANA. To avoid any inconsistences 
in the analysis the scenario is chosen so that these factors do not alter the 
results. The author makes the decision to adjust the enemy forces to have similar 
properties to those of the BLUE agents. So, weather and daytime will not give 
one side an advantage. 
Nevertheless, the missing battlefield factors must be kept in mind for the 
analysis part of this thesis to draw the appropriate conclusions and find accurate 
relationships between the factors. 
Even if the author is confident that the major relationships can be found 
with the current version of MANA—as has been proven in many other theses 
done with MANA before—it must be stated that any interactions of the 
considered battlefield factors with these two factors are lost and must be left to 
future research. 
2. Battlefield Factors Considered 
The considered main battlefield factors, and how they are implemented in 
MANA, are described in the following sections. A brief summary of all other 
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considered factors is given at the end of this chapter to provide the reader with a 
better insight into the simulation capabilities. 
3. Impact of Terrain and Evaluation on Line of Sight 
MANA is able to calculate the line of sight (LOS) corresponding to the 
evaluation and the terrain. Every agent has a certain height for its sensors, and 
this value is used to determine the area they can see. Terrain can cut the line of 
sight and is modeled in MANA with three properties: 
• “Going” adjusts the given physical movement rate ground units 
have and so determines the speed in a given terrain. 
• “Concealment” determines how well agents can hide in it. 
• “Cover” stands for the protection the terrain offers against all kinds 
of weapons. 
4. Situational Awareness and Behavior 
Every agent in MANA has its own situational awareness map. This map 
contains information from its own sensors and from other agents transmitted 
through the established communication channels. Every agent in MANA reacts to 
its available information and not the “real,” simulated situation corresponding to a 
certain set of behavior rules. This is most important as it enables every agent to 
create realistic battle behavior and allows analyzing the effect of individual 
situational awareness. 
5. Different Agent Classes and Threat Levels 
MANA has the capability to assign agents a certain class and a certain 
threat level. In the scenario agent classes are used to differentiate between 
infantry and vehicles for sensor detection and classification ranges, as infantry is 
harder to detect than a vehicle. The agent class is also used for defining which 
weapon shall be used against which target. 
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The agent class is also used to establish a tactical fighting systematic. For 
example, it enables the agent to shoot at the most dangerous enemy first and to 
avoid unrealistic firing behavior like hitting a battle tank with an AK 74 rifle. The 
threat levels are used to prohibit tactical wrong decisions like shooting at a single 
infantry soldier with heavy artillery.   
Table 3.   Different threat levels and classes for MANA agents are used to 






Non-lethal 1 1 
Infantry 1 2 
Infantry 
Carrier 3 3 
Battle Tank 4 4 
Rotary Wing 5 5 
Mine/IED 1 6 
 
Other factors implemented in the scenario include the following: 
• Sensor capacities  
• Sensor field-of-view 
• Direction of sensors 
• Sensor height 
• Weapon ranges 
• Weapon effects 
• Possibility of fratricide 
• Communication (ranges, delay of information)  
• Armor 
• Rate of fire 
• Reaction time 
• Ammunition 
• Fuel 
• Weapon angels 
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• Personal Concealment 
• Cover due terrain and prepared positions 
• Changed behaviors for agents shoot at, injured or enemy in sight 
• Platoon formations 
• Aggregated higher command intelligent sources 
• Given orders 
F. DETAILED SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
Several elements of the scenario, including the terrain and tactical 
considerations, are discussed in detail in this section. 
1. Terrain Description 
The battlefield (Figure 9) is a box measuring 30 km in width and 40 km in 
length taken from Google Earth. The area represents terrain on the western 
border of the state of Colorado in the United States along the Highway 491. 
 
Figure 9.  Battlefield map (From Google Earth, n.d.). 
Highway 491 
37 37 46 14 N; 
108 58 51 44 W 
37 45 56 16 N; 
108 41 9 05 W 
37 19 45 80N; 
108 45 4 51 W 
37 28 12.44N; 
108 27 34 72 W 
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The scenario terrain is chosen to provide a challenging battlefield with 
good cover possibilities for the infantry, but also to allow for areas where long 
range, air based and high technology weapons can be effectively applied.  
The terrain consists of different layers. The basic layer is called “Typical 
Terrain” and represents the prevailing terrain type in the area which provides a 
high movement rate for combat vehicles but also some cover and locations for 
battle positions. Especially for infantry, this terrain provides good possibilities for 
concealment. Figures 10 and 11 are pictures made from the area. 
 





In the west of the chosen area the terrain consists mainly of rocky 
canyons. These canyons are only accessible by vehicles on a limited basis and 
provide excellent cover and concealment. Therefore, it is utilized by the RED 
infantry forces to increase their combat strength. 
 
Figure 11.  Picture of the “Canyon Rocks.” 
As the canyons are like cuts in the terrain, the line of sight calculations are 
especially important in these areas. Highway 491 provides mechanized forces 
the ability to move at high speed from north to south. The forests in the south of 
the operation area are modeled as dense vegetation with high concealment and 
medium cover. Sensor detection rates are very restricted for agents in this 







MANA settings for the used terrain types are given in Table 4. 
Table 4.   The values used for terrain calculations (how fast an agent can 
move, how easily it can be hit, and how likely a detection for a given 
sensor is). 
Type Going Cover  Conceal 
Billiard 1 0 0 
Wall 0 1 1 
Hilltop 0.9 0.1 0.95 
Road 1 0 0 
LightBush 0.75 0.1 0.3 
DenseBush 0.2 0.3 0.9 
Water 0 0 0 
TypicalTerrain 0.8 0.3 0.6 
CanyonRocks 0.1 0.6 0.9 
Forest 0.4 0.2 0.7 
 
The terrain has been modeled in MANA (Figure 12) where every terrain type 
from Table 4 is represented by a certain color. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Map of terrain types modeled in MANA. 
Legend: 








2. Tactical Description: BLUE Force Mission 
Reinforced 2nd Company 1/28 Mechanized Infantry Battalion attacks 
along Highway 491 30 km to the south and takes Object 1 as a prerequisite for 
the future attack of the battalion against Object HAWK. The 2nd Company is the 
major effort and is reinforced by a platoon of M1 Abrams. It has priority in indirect 
fire support and is the main focus of the battalion’s UAV reconnaissance effort. 
The Apache attack helicopter of the 2/MAW (Marine Air Wing) will provide close 
air support and additional reconnaissance capabilities. The intent of Commander 
2nd Company is to maintain as much attack speed as possible to keep the enemy 
off balance but also to destroy detected enemies in the area of operations. After 
reaching Object 1, 2nd Company will secure the object until follow-on forces of the 
3rd Company attack over their own positions for Object HAWK. The 2nd company 
will then follow. The operational plan is sketched out in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Graphical operation plan of BLUE forces.  
OBJECT1 
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3. Tactical Description: RED Force Mission 
As shown in Figure 14, the operational plan of the RED forces consists of 
three phases that are carried out by three infantry groups. 
The mission of Infantry Group 1 is to attack the BLUE forces from fortified 
and concealed positions at close range with surprising fire and cause as many 
casualties as possible in order to break the BLUE attack speed. 
At the identified ambush site, they are to attack the BLUE armored 
vehicles at long ranges with flanking fire from fortified and concealed positions to 
cause casualties. 
Meanwhile, Infantry Groups 2 and 3 use mines and IEDs to fortify the 
northern position. When the BLUE force reaches the minefield, attack it with 
Infantry Group 2 and indirect fire support from the 120 mm mortar. The T90-M 
platoon will counterattack and destroy BLUE forces at the minefield. The SA 18 
SAM team provides air defense. Infantry Group 3 will intercept any BLUE force 
that breaks through the northern position. Company HQ will coordinate fire 
requests and provide enemy information. All forces will fight from prepared 
defense positions and will use the advantage of surprise. The intention is to inflict 




Figure 14.  RED three-phase operational plan.  
G. BATTLE MODELING 
The battle itself is divided in three phases according to the RED defense 
plan. The author chose this approach to achieve different fighting situations in the 
full spectrum of war in one scenario. As in reality the outcome of one phase 
influences the other phases. 
1. Phase 1: Ambush 
The first phase represents an ambush which can take place in irregular 
warfare and peace support operations. The enemy (Infantry Group 1) does not 
have the fire power necessary to defeat the BLUE forces. Its aim is more to inflict 
casualties on BLUE. Therefore, the RED infantry tries to let BLUE get close and 
then attacks with small arms fire, heavy machine guns, RPG 29 and 60 mm 
mortars. After RED opens fire, the superior fire power of BLUE usually destroys 
RED. BLUE has the advantage of immediate support by UAV, CAS, and 155mm 
indirect fire. Sometimes RED is already detected by BLUE before BLUE is in the 









a. Unrealistic Behavior 
Normally ambushers do not attack an enemy force of such a 
superior strength without providing themselves a possibility of escape. Here, the 
RED agents fight to death. As the model is only used to determine the 
performance of future combat systems and most BLUE casualties occur at the 
beginning of the battle, the unrealistic behavior does not influence the results and 
interactions of this study. 
b. Modeling 
The RED agents can open fire at their maximal weapon range as 
soon as BLUE agents are detected. With this behavior they would lose their 
advantage of surprise and would have no great chance to inflict casualties. 
Therefore, the weapon ranges of RED’s long-range weapon systems are 
reduced in this phase so that the ambush starts with RED fire at close distances. 
To ensure that BLUE has a low probability of detecting the RED ambusher early, 
the concealment of the RED agents is high (97% plus terrain).  After RED opens 
fire this advantage is lost. The RED agents use a canyon as their major cover 
which crosses the Highway 491 from west to east. So, this area is a natural 
ambush site.  
As the terrain is relatively open besides the canyon, BLUE 
advances with the main battle tanks first. They get immediate support by indirect 
fire and their Apache air escorts as the air escorts stay close, if a force 
approaches a terrain with a high possibility of an ambush. The Bradley will 
release the infantry if it is taking fire and will provide cover fire. Tests have shown 
that the dispersion of the infantry is the most critical phase for BLUE as indirect 
area fire can cause mass casualties among the infantry. The BLUE infantry 
immediately attacks the known positions of the RED forces after being 
dismounted. After 30 minutes without firefight the Bradley picks up the infantry 
squad and resumes the attack with mounted infantry. 
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2. Phase 2: Hit and Run 
The second phase of the battle consists of a long-range, precision attack 
of two RED MILAN anti-tank systems on BLUE while they are moving south on 
the highway to operation objective 1. 
a. Unrealistic Behavior 
Again, the ambusher would not attack an enemy force of such a 
superior strength without the possibility to withdraw. Here, the RED forces try to 
inflict as much damage as they can before they are killed or run out of 
ammunition. 
b. Modeling 
The concealment rate of the RED agents is very high. As there are 
only two agents they usually are not detected by any BLUE agent before they 
shoot. As the probability of a successful hit declines with the range, the MILAN 
agents hold their fire until BLUE is close to 3000 meters. After RED forces shoot 
they are usually detected and quickly destroyed. 
c. Phase 1 and 2 Insight 
An immediate and logical insight is that if the enemy tries to take 
advantage of a surprise attack and BLUE has sophisticated sensors like UAVs 
and superior fire power, RED is more successful if it uses a minimum number of 
troops with long-range weapons. Otherwise, RED can be detected before it 
launches the attack. So there is a tradeoff between the number of ambushers 
used, their expected inflicted damage and the possibility of getting detected 
early. It seems from the knowledge of the author that not even ambush-
experienced Taliban groups are fully aware of this simple concept in their 
considerations for an ambush force and used equipment. 
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3. Phase 3: Main Battle 
In the third phase, the conventional warfare aspect is modeled. All RED 
forces have communication links to their company headquarters and share a 
common information picture. RED consists of a combined arms team with 
infantry, mines, long range anti-tank weapons, heavy mortars for indirect fire 
support, air defense, and a heavy battle tank reserve. RED fights from prepared 
and concealed positions according to their tactical doctrine as described in the 
TRADOC scenario.  
The BLUE forces had normally already suffered casualties in the first two 
phases when they reach the third phase. This aspect increases the variability of 
the result for this phase, which is desired. It implements the consideration that if 
a battle takes place in reality, the actual available forces can be less than the 
nominal strength of the unit. Furthermore, the availability of the air assets ranges 
from low to high due to the duration of the first two phases. It could be that the air 
assets already took casualties and are no longer available. The battle order of 
the BLUE forces is different from time to time depending on the other phases. 
While testing the scenario, the author found that the agents are able to adjust 
their behavior realistically to the occurring situation within their given rules. 
When the BLUE forces arrive, RED agents from Infantry Group 2 detect 
the BLUE agents, and long range anti-tank weapons open fire acting as the 
security force of the minefield. RED infantry is able to give target information to 
the heavy mortars, and the mortars are able to aim at the enemy with unarmored 
infantry first. When the BLUE agents further advance the counterattack of the 
RED T90M tank platoon is triggered. The T90M usually causing much damage 
especially when they are able to fire with their long-range missiles. When the 
BLUE agents get through the northern position concentrated and with enough 
combat strength left, they are able to destroy the infantry in the last position and 
get to the objective. In some cases when the BLUE forces had split up or had 
already taken too many casualties, they could not prevent RED Infantry Group 3 
from holding their position and achieving a tactical victory for RED.  
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H. ADDITIONAL MODELING CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Communications 
All BLUE MANA squads have a direct communication channel to the 
company HQ and report their position, friends, unknowns, and enemies. The 
company HQ provides them with information summaries. As the RAVEN UAV is 
an asset from the battalion, it has a time delay of five minutes. If artillery is 
requested it has a two minute time delay. These times are fast and represent 
functioning modern network warfare. Notice that even with a 100% reliable 
communication link, there is still the possibility of fratricide due to the delay of 
information. Only in the third phase do the RED agents have a similar 
communication network as here a conventional, sophisticated enemy is modeled. 
2. Sensors 
A sensor in MANA consists basically of two functions: detecting an object 
and classifying it. The probabilities for time between detection and probabilities 
for classifying an unknown detection are calculated according to the distance and 
the terrain. A “line of sight” calculation is made.  
3. Infantry 
All agents have separate sensors for infantry and vehicle agents to take 
into account that infantry is more difficult to detect. Well-trained infantry in 
prepared position are modeled to hide completely from enemy sensors until they 
open fire. The muzzle flash can be easily detected. So, the concealment rates of 
the terrain still apply after the first shot, but the personal concealment of the firing 
agent is reduced. 
It is difficult to ensure that all dismounted infantry is picked up by the 
corresponding infantry carrier. The most practical solution is to set the 
“embussing range” to 1500 meters. In case an infantry carrier is destroyed and 
the corresponding BLUE infantry is still alive, the infantry is ordered to attack 
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dismounted toward the mission goal. It is not possible to reassign them to other 
carriers. 
4. M1 Abrams Battle Tanks 
The main battle tanks follow the Highway 491 to the south. Whenever they 
get shot at they go into a combat mode, slow their speed down and try to attack 
the enemy at distances over 500 meters. The tanks are modeled to keep close 
distances as a platoon and advance together with the infantry vehicles to provide 
mutual cover. 
5. T90M Counterattack 
The counterattack of the T90M takes place in a heavy terrain where they 
are able to use their long-range weapon systems. In reality, detailed preparation 
and reconnaissance is needed to judge if the counterattack is possible in the real 
terrain. As this was not possible, the terrain is modeled to enable the attack. 
6. Artillery 
Modern artillery has the ability to detect enemy artillery fire almost 
immediately, and the first priority is to destroy enemy artillery whenever the 
position is known. Therefore, the RED indirect fire agents lose their concealment 
after their first shots, and the fire logic of the BLUE artillery has priority for the 
RED artillery agents. 
7. Breaking Points 
Historically, battles are seldom fought until one side is completely 
annihilated. Especially in asymmetric scenarios like Afghanistan or Iraq, the 
BLUE (i.e., coalition forces) would not risk heavy casualties to avoid losing the 
public’s support of the war. In this scenario neither BLUE nor RED has a 
breaking point, and both fight to the end. Even considered as nonrealistic 
behavior it is modeled by purpose. The more intense fight is expected to give 
 63 
better insights into the relationships between the input factors of a new ground 
combat system. 
8. Stopping Conditions 
MANA uses stopping conditions to automatically end a run. The chosen 
stopping conditions for the scenario include the following: 
• RED has lost 69 agents; 
• BLUE has lost 35 agents; 
• The BLUE tanks reach the mission goal; or 
• The maximum time of 50000 time steps (approximately 14 combat 
hours) is reached as after about this time “fresh” forces would 
substitute the exhausted BLUE force. 
The chosen casualty thresholds for BLUE and RED are not their total 
agent number. The reason for this is that it is not possible to end the battle if 
BLUE has only the company headquarters and the artillery agent left, or when 
there is a single infantry soldier reaching the objective. Both cannot be 
considered a BLUE victory. 
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V. BASELINE SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
The baseline scenario is supposed to be a reference for the interpretation 
of the performance results for the possible future GCVs in the simulation runs. It 
is also possible to test the results for validity. Using his knowledge gained in 
modern combat, the author examined the baseline scenario runs to determine 
whether realistic relationships could be deduced from the results. It is also 
important to see how long the scenario run times are and how large the variance 
of the MOE are, and to use the variance results for power calculations to 
determine a sufficient number of replications for the DOE. 
The basic scenario is chosen to run with a resolution of one second per 
time step and ten meters for LOS calculations. As MANA is a time step model, 
results depended on the chosen time step size. For example, in every time step, 
each agent is tested to see whether it detects a certain object. Several tests have 
been made running the scenario with lower time step resolutions than one 
second. The author watched the behavior of the agents during these runs. If the 
time steps were greater than five seconds, unrealistic patterns were detected 
(such as infantry was not picked up by the carriers and had to go on 
dismounted). It was determined that a resolution of one second gives reliable 
results. Detection and classification rates have been modeled accordingly. A ten 
meter resolution has been chosen due to similar experiments and due to the 
advice of Research Assistant Mary McDonald, who has years of experience with 
the software. 
The runtime according to the settings on an ASUSTek Laptop (with Intel® 
Core i5 CPU M450 @ 2.40 GHz) are a maximum of 35 minutes per run as a 
simulation run ends when it reaches its maximum of 50000 time steps. So, 
computers are able to run replications in a reasonable amount of time. For the 
available cluster it takes on average 315 seconds for one node to perform a 
single replication. This, multiplied by 1000, but divided by the number of 
processors (68), yields to 1.3 hours for 1000 replications at one design point. 
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A. REFERENCE ANALYSIS 
The casualties of BLUE and RED in the base scenario for 
1000 replications are shown in Figure 15 and Table 5. While RED gets 
annihilated most of the time (90% casualties), BLUE has to pay for this result 
with a casualty rate of 50%. The most casualties in numbers occur for the RED 
infantry, which is not surprising as they are the most numerous and one of the 
least protected forces on the battlefield. Interestingly, there is a direct comparison 
with the similar modeled BLUE infantry. Due to their much better support by 
armored vehicles, CAS and indirect fire, their loss expectance is only half of what 
it is for a RED infantry solder‒even when the RED infantry has the advantage of 
concealment and cover. In other words, even when considered inferior in a direct 
comparison the survivability of BLUE infantry is higher due to the surrounding 
force structure. 
Another aspect of importance, especially for Western democracies, is the 
number of wounded and killed soldiers. MANA only counts killed agents. The 
number of soldiers taken out of action must be calculated according to the 
number of soldiers which are represented by each agent. In total numbers, BLUE 
lost an average of 31 soldiers in each battle while RED lost 78. This results in an 
exchange rate of about 1:2.5 in favor of BLUE. 
 
Figure 15.  Histogram of the casualties for 1000 replications. The x-axis shows 
the type of casualties. 
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Table 5.   Summary statistics for the casualties of 1000 replications. “Agents 
killed” shows the total number of casualties; “Percentage lost” gives 
an average of how many agents were killed; “Soldiers lost” 
calculates the corresponding number of soldiers dead. 





RQ11 Raven 205 20.5 0 
AH64D_AttHeli 1251 62.6 2502 
Bradley M2A3 1991 49.8 5973 
Bradley_Infantry 15787 56.4 15787 
M1A2 Abrams Sep 1656 41.4 6624 
IED 1000 100 0 
Minefield 4971 82.9 0 
RED_60mm_mortar 3000 100 3000 
RED_AGS30_Squad 1277 31.9 2554 
RED_Company_HQ 3 0.3 30 
RED_Inf_Squad 40039 93.1 40039 
RED_M120mm_mortar 921 92.1 3684 
RED_Milan 5954 99.2 11908 
RED_SA18 1048 52.4 1048 
T-90M 4000 100 16000 
Total RED 62213 87.6 78263 
Total BLUE 20890 53.6 30886 
Total 83103 75.5 2.53 Ratio 
 
Another overview is given in Figure 16, which shows the number of 
casualties inflicted by each type of system or soldier. Artillery and close air 
support (CAS) through Apaches are the primary contributors to RED casualties in 
the MANA scenario.  
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Figure 16.  Histogram of casualties inflicted by the different types of systems. 
TRADOC simulated the underlying scenario with the Advanced 
Warfighting Simulation (AWARS) software at the division level with similar force 
structures. A comparison is done to give some additional hints as to whether the 
MANA model has reasonable results.  
First, the importance of the artillery matches up with TRADOC’s results. 
The casualties inflicted by the Apaches are also in accordance with AWARS’s 
results, and even the distribution of the killed targets matches due a similar 
composition of the enemy. Not included in the comparison are casualties of 
logistic units as they are not modeled in MANA. As the RED force uses more 
advanced weapons than in the original TRADOC scenario and many of the 
simulated combatants fight-to-the-end without trying to conserve combat power 
for follow on missions, the logical conclusion is that the RED and BLUE casualty 
levels must be higher. RED is able to inflict a worse casualty exchange rate from 
BLUE’s perspective. The TRADOC simulation estimates that about 10000 RED 
soldiers are killed for a loss of 1100 BLUEs. This is an exchange rate of about 
9:1 against a 2.5:1 ratio for the MANA scenario. RED inflicted about 10% losses 
on the BLUE force while suffering about 20% to 30% losses in AWARS, which 
represents the assumed differences. (TRADOC, 2009) 
TRADOC results and major insights (TRADOC, 2009) include the 
following: 
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a. Both the Coalition and the Threat forces can claim a “victory in 
this scenario. The Coalition forces achieved their main objective of 
restoring the international border, and their units did not lose 
substantial combat power (lowest strength brigade was at 87% 
aggregate strength at the end of the run). The Threat forces 
achieved their goal of preserving combat power for their Phase II 
(infantry battalions at 76%). They also inflicted over 1,100 troop 
losses to Coalition forces. 
b. The Threat’s ability to avoid detection in complex terrain allows 
them to degrade the Coalition standoff advantage and to preserve 
forces for Phase II. 
c. The Threat infantry division can inflict casualties to BLUE’s 
mechanized forces. Their tactics allow them to draw Coalition 
forces into close combat in complex terrain where their infantry 
weapons are effective against all Coalition systems at close ranges. 
Heavy machine guns are effective against armored vehicles except 
tanks. The Threat infantry is also equipped with a variety of anti-
tank guided missiles which prove effective against Coalition tanks. 
d. An extensive obstacle plan enables Threat forces to delay the / 
DIV advance by 24-48 hours. However, their plan did not include 
the 11 DP IN DIV exploiting this delay in any way. 
In analyzing the comparison results, we can see that the conclusion that 
both “forces can claim a ‘victory’ in this scenario” holds true. Both forces have 
similar casualty distributions. In our run, RED agents do not try to avoid 
detection, and so, TRADOC insight “b.” is not applicable for comparison. On the 
other hand, the third TRADOC insight that the “Threat infantry division can inflict 
casualties to mechanized forces” is fully emphasized by the MANA scenario, 
which obtains the same results. Finally, the mines and IEDs used in the MANA 
scenario cause BLUE to take much more time to reach their goals. BLUE needs 
approximately one hour (distance through speed) in an unopposed scenario, 
while the baseline scenario requires five hours ± 13 minutes with a confidence of 
95% and 1000 replications (see Figure 17). So, TRADOC insight “d.” matches 
the MANA scenario.  
A histogram of the observed battle duration of each run and summary 
statistics are shown in Figure 17. As can be seen from the plot, the battle 
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duration has an approximated normal distribution around the mean of 18000 
seconds and another peak at exactly 50000 seconds for the runs which are 
stopped by the time limit of 50000 seconds per battle. 
  
Figure 17.  Battle Time in seconds: the attached summary statistics describe the 
observed values according to the mean and the variance (here called 
“Standard deviation” and “Standard Error Mean”); “Upper and lower 
95% Mean” gives a calculated 95% confidence interval for the 
observed mean, and “N” stands for the number of replications. 
Appendix B contains more detailed data from the basic scenario. This data 
has been analyzed by the author to find “bugs,” unrealistic behavior or infeasible 
outcomes, such as helicopters destroyed by mines. As none were found the 
author is confident that the result represents a realistic, intense fight where the 
right basic relationships exist and insights can be gleaned.   
BLUE’s mission goal is to destroy the RED forces or to break through and 
reach the mission objective with a sufficiently large force. RED’s objective is to 
inflict as many casualties on BLUE as possible. Normally, breaking points are 
reached much earlier, but with the special setting of the scenario (to fight until 




• (69 RED casualties or BLUE tanks reached objectives) and less than 25 
BLUE casualties    => 655 BLUE  victories  
• 25 or more BLUE casualties  => 327 RED victories  
• less than 69 RED casualties and less than 25 BLUE casualties and BLUE 
did not reach his objective   => 18 draws   
As there are no breaking points for the forces, the draws resulted from the 
fact that the simulation stopped at the time limit without one side reaching its 
goals. 
With less than 25 casualties, BLUE has about one-third of its combat 
power left. In other words, BLUE could lose two-thirds of its combat strength and 
still achieve a victory. For the purpose of this thesis, this is a reasonable 
definition even when it is more than questionable that a Western democracy 
would attack with such an expected loss rate.   
As there are times when enemy agents remain after the battle time 
reaches its maximum value, the one MOE for the casualties should be a casualty 
ratio. The results for the defined MOEs in Chapter IV are shown in Table 6. 













































Notice that especially the BLUE casualties have a high variance, which 




B. POWER CALCULATIONS 
One of the purposes for the baseline runs is to estimate the variability of 
the casualty rates for the scenario. The BLUE and RED agents killed per battle 
are summed up and the standard deviations б𝐵 and б𝑅 are calculated. The 
results are shown in Figure 18.  
Figure 18.  BLUE and RED casualties. 
Note that the “quantiles” in Figure 18 are another measure of how many 
observations fall in a certain range. The quantiles also describe the distribution of 
these observations. 
From Figure 18, it can be seen that the maximum number of BLUE 
casualties is 37 even though BLUE has 39 agents. The reason is that the BLUE 
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Company Headquarters and the BLUE artillery are out of reach for the RED 
forces and cannot be attacked. More importantly, due to the high variability of the 
BLUE casualties a 95% confidence interval has a width of .45 casualties for 
1000 replications. If a margin of error is set to +/-1 casualties and a 95% 
confidence is desired, the following calculations for the number of replications 
needed per design point result (Devore, 2011): 
𝟏.𝟗𝟔 ∗ 𝒔
√𝒏
= 𝟏 with s = 7.32 (estimator for the true standard deviation) 
n= 206.  
That leads to the conclusion that in the DOE phase at least 
206 replications per design point are necessary to achieve a statistical resolution 
of one casualty difference with 95% confidence. The calculation is explicitly done 
for the number of BLUE casualties because they have the highest variance. As 
battles usually have the highest variance near parity conditions, the variance is 
expected to be reduced when the BLUE forces are improved by new weapon 
systems as this factor shifts the battle away from parity (Hillestad, Owen, & 
Blumenthal, 1993).  
For the RED casualties the variance is smaller, and the half-width of a 
95% confidence interval is only .3 for 1000 replications. For the battle duration a 
half-width of 13 minutes for a 95% confidence interval is calculated.  
As the author wants to use statistical tests to estimate if there is a 
difference in the means between casualties; type-2 errors have to be accounted 






Drawing different beta values, which represent the power, leads to Figure 
19. The power value represents how likely it is to reject the null hypothesis if it is 
not correct, or in other words, not to commit a type-2 error. Note that the colored 
lines in Figure 19 show the different power for a given resolution and given 
number of replications. 
 
Figure 19.  Power calculation for replication size. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
When improvement of the BLUE force is considered, that is, at least one 
fewer BLUE agent gets killed per battle (or one more RED agent is killed per 
battle), a required power for statistical tests of .9 leads to the consequence that 
the DOE should have about 460 replications per design point. With 206 design 
points a resolution of +-1.5 is achievable at the same power level. 
To get a better estimate of how changes in agents affects the scenario, 
the author chose to alter the sensor of the modeled RAVEN UAV for infantry 
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detection from the data shown in Table 7 to an immediate detection for the UAV 
sensors up to 4000 meters with a constant classify probability of 0.2. In the new 
scenario 1000 replications were performed. The change altered the expected 
number of BLUE casualties from 20.89 to 20.16 and increased the RED 
casualties from 62.213 to 62.73. If this is already a statistically relevant 
difference, it can be tested by a t-test.  
A t-test uses statistical calculations to test the theory that the means for a 
given sample size and variance are the same. As statistics only estimate the 
population, there is no result obtained with absolute certainty. Usually, the test 
threshold is chosen at a 95% confidence level. This goal is reached if the 
resulting p-value of the test is below 0.05.  For the BLUE casualties the result is 
p-value = 0.02737 and a p-value = 0.01961 for the RED casualties. This shows 
that the hypothesis that the means of the casualties for BLUE and RED forces 
are equal can be rejected within the chosen confidence. So, we conclude that 
difference between the means has changed. 
Notice that every difference can be statistically relevant if the sample size 
is big enough. For 460 replications a difference of 1 would be needed, as can be 
seen in the previous paragraph. A reduced casualty expectance of 0.7 for BLUE 
corresponds to about 4% of the whole casualties. The difference achievable by 
460 replications is about 5%.  
Table 7.   The average time between detection and classification probabilities 
for the RAVEN infantry sensor in the basic scenario. 
range 50 2000 4000 6000 
Average time between detection 0 0 5 10 
Probability of classification given 
detection 
0.2 0.1 0.01 0.005 
 
The author expected that the exchange rate is more favorable for BLUE, 
which is proven. Unexpected was the finding that the incidents of fratricide are 
reduced by a better situational awareness of the BLUE agents. So, in the altered 
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scenario, no fratricide at all occurred from Apache helicopters on Bradley or 
BLUE infantry. Overall, the simulation shows that the improved UAV sensor 
increases the situational awareness of all BLUE agents, which leads to a higher 
BLUE survivability and lethality. The relationships between the agents according 
to lethality and survivability are obtained, as can be seen in Appendix B. The only 
exception occurred for the UAV itself, as is shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20.  RAVEN survivability comparison: improved sensors (left);  
basic sensors (right). 
It can be seen that the number of UAVs killed by RED infantry is 






VI. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The analysis of the results from the DOE setup over multiple analysis tools 
used to gain insight is provided in this chapter. First, this is done for an infantry 
carrier CGV. After that, the steps are repeated for a main battle tank GCV. In the 
end both sets of results are compared, and additional insights are stated. 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
To implement a DOE for a MANA scenario, the steps detailed in the 
following paragraphs have to be conducted. 
1. Define Factors 
Factors with ranges based on the analysis in Chapter II are defined as 
continuous, discrete, or binary. Some of the factors (weapons and sensors) are 
data tables. These tables are modeled with one continuous factor. To give an 
example, the detection sensor for infantry has following underlying data table 
(see Table 8) for the modeled Bradley agents. 
Table 8.   Data table for the infantry detection sensor modeled for the Bradley 
infantry carrier. 
Sensor Inf 
Detection Range 1 1000 2000 3000 4000 
  Avg Time between 0 0 5 10 15 
Classify Range 1 - 2000 3000 4000 
  Prob/Turn 1 - 1 0.7 0.5 
Class  2 (infantry)           
 
To turn the table into a factor, the ranges for detection and classification 
are multiplied by a continuous value while the corresponding average time 
between detection and the probabilities for classification are kept constant. 
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Weapons systems and sensor types can be installed on the GCV or left off, 
which is controlled by a binary factor. 
2. Enter DOE Factors in DOE Tool 
The defined factors are entered in an already developed DOE 
development tool. For the analysis, a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) design developed by Prof. Susan M. Sanchez from the NPS Department 
of Operations Research is used (S. Sanchez, 2011).  
3. Analyze Interactions and Dependencies between Factors 
The benefit of such a design is that it allows the analyst to alter all factors 
at the same time and avoids high correlations between them. It also allows for 
the exploration of the multidimensional answer-space with a “space-filling design” 
without using an impracticable amount of design points. To restate it more 
simply: The NOLH design allows analyzing the interactions and dependencies 
between the factors by carefully choosing the combinations of the factor values 
according to a mathematical process so that there are no large gaps in the factor 
value combinations. To give an example, a 14 factor full design where every 
factor can only have two values would have 214 possibilities, which results in 
16384 design points. Given the calculated necessary 460 replications, this would 
mean 7.5 million runs, which would take on the available cluster 314 days of 
runtime. With the NOLH it is possible to do a comparable analysis with 
65 carefully selected design points, which leads to 29900 total simulated battles. 
This experimental set can be done in less than three days on the computing 
cluster (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007).   
4. Collect Results 
After the DOE is setup, a spreadsheet file containing the design is turned 
into a batch file which then controls the cluster runs. The produced results are 
then combined in one excel.csv file. This thesis used a combination of JMP, R 
and Microsoft Excel as tools to analyze the output data. 
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B. INFANTRY CARRIER 
1. Implemented DOE and Data Validation 
The first analyzed GCV is an infantry carrier. Therefore, the modeled 
Bradley platoon is substituted by the imaginary GCV with different tangibles and 
physical factors. To achieve comparability, the behavior, tactics used and the 
orders given to the GCV are exactly the same as for the Bradley platoon. Also, 
the number of vehicles modeled remains the same. The 14 factors shown in 
Table 9 are varied in the DOE. 
Table 9.   Used factors for infantry carrier DOE; ranges deduced from results in 
Chapter II. The first column is the factor name; the second is the 
squad in the MANA scenario to which the factor is applied. The 
remarks column specifies which attribute of a data table is to be 
varied. The variable class is necessary for specifying the factor type 
for the DOE. 
 
* The factor has a data table representation. 
Additional remarks related to Table 9.   
• Factor Centric Warfare: Summarized effects of advanced 
reconnaissance assets and a functioning information distribution 
process. A value of 1 means that the BLUE external 
reconnaissance assets are excellent. Most RED agents are 
detected upfront, and the information is passed down the command 
Infantry carrier
lower current upper Variable class Unit
Squad Number Remarks/applied on
Number of Hits 4, 14, 15, 16 1 1 3 discrete
Concealment 4, 14, 15, 16 0 0 99 continious
Speed 4, 14, 15, 16 40 50 60 continious km/h
Armor 4, 14, 15, 16 300 500 1000 continious mm RHA
Number of Inf 5, 11, 12, 13 no of agents in squad 7 7 12 discrete
DetectionInf* 4, 14, 15, 16 (sensor1) range for detection and classification 0.8 1 2 continious DataTable
DetectionVeh* 4, 14, 15, 16 (sensor2) range for detection and classification 0.8 1 2 continious DataTable
Bushmaster* 4, 14, 15, 16 (weapon1) only on range 0.8 1 2 continious DataTable
MG* 4, 14, 15, 16 (weapon2) only on range 0.8 1 2 continious DataTable
TOW* 4, 14, 15, 16 (weapon3) on range and on penetration 0.8 1 2 continious DataTable
Mortar* 4, 14, 15, 16 (weapon4) if weapon is added or not 0 0 1 discrete binary
Centric Warefare 8 (sensor1) AvgTime between detection 0.01 1 1 continious
EW  24 (all comlinks) Reliability 0.01 1 1 continious
Active Defense
1,2,21,26(weapon1); 6,17,18 
(weapon4); 23 (weapon1,3)   Hit probability 0.2 1 1 continious
Ranges
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chain to every BLUE agent immediately. A value of 0.01 means that 
the BLUE Company has to rely totally on its own sensor platforms. 
• Factor Electromagnetic Warfare (EW): Here the effects of EW on 
the enemy network in phase 3 of the battle are modeled. It starts 
from a perfectly reliable network for the RED agents represented by 
the value 1 to a nearly useless network where only 1% of the 
reports about detections of BLUE agents are transmitted. This 
affects the RED ability to use indirect fire in particular. 
• Factor Active Defense: Simulates hard and soft kill systems which 
protect vehicles and nearby infantry; therefore, the hit probability of 
the enemy anti-tank weapons is reduced by 20% of the basic hit 
probability. A value of 0.2 means that the active defense systems 
can destroy 80% of all incoming anti-tank missiles. 
The DOE for these factors is given in Appendix C and consists of 
65 design points. The design points also represent the degrees of freedom (DF) 
available for creating a meta-model of the data. As two DF are already consumed 
by the usual error and variance estimation, only 63 factors can be implemented 
in any of the following meta-models. 
2. Data Validation of the Output File 
Data validation on the output file consists of several steps before analysis: 
• Check the data file for completeness as well as for corrupted and 
missing entries. 
• Check the design by examining the distribution of the factors. Has 
the design been implemented in the correct way, and how are the 
values of the factors distributed? For example, the histograms in 
Figure 21 show the factors for the number of infantry carried per 
GCV and the continuous multiplier of the GCV sensor used for 
detecting enemy infantry.  
• The “space filling” behavior of the DOE can be seen by elevating 
the scatterplots. If the factor is not discrete the points cover the 
whole area in about equal distances. The scatterplots also show 
correlation between the factors. If the RED lines are flat, the 




Figure 21.  Histograms for the frequency of factor values. The left histogram 
shows a discrete factor (how many soldiers are carried by the GCV) 
and the right one shows a continuous one (which multiplies the ranges 
for the data table of the modeled GCV infantry sensor). As can be 
seen by the left histogram, the number of infantry carried is unequally 
distributed between 7 and 10. This is not a problem as long as there 
are enough design points for the fitting of meta-models. The inequality 
is introduced by “balancing” the DOE and because the 65 design 
points cannot be divided equally by four. The right histogram shows 
that for a continuous factor the values are equally distributed over the 
whole range.  
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Figure 22.  Scatterplot matrix. All factors are shown to identify space-filling and 
correlation behavior of the DOE. For the discrete factors “#hits,” “inf,” 
and “mortar” the points cannot be space filling as they are fixed by the 
discrete values. 
The data passed all checks and can therefore be used for regression analysis. 
3. Correlation of the MOEs 
The next step is to test the MOEs defined in Chapter IV to see if they are 
correlated. A high correlation means that the correlated MOEs can be combined, 
and the same insight can be gained by fewer MOEs. For GCV as infantry carrier, 
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seven MOEs are defined, and their correlation is shown as values in Table 10  
and graphically in Figure 23.  The correlation can be positive or negative to 
combine MOEs. The threshold can be set by the analyst. Here, the author chose 
to set it to 0.7 as this threshold has been used in similar problems in lectures at 
NPS. 
Table 10.   Correlation coefficients; the defined threshold of 0.7 is exceeded for 
“Inf_Cas” with “BLUE_Cas” and for “BLUE_victory” with “BLUE_Cas” 
as well as for “BLUE_Victory” with “Inf_Cas”. Missing values result 
from cases where no BLUE casualties occurred so the casualty ratio 
could not be calculated. 
 
 
From Table 10 and Figure 23 it can be deduced that “BLUE_victory” and 
infantry casualties were highly correlated with the total BLUE casualties. While 
this correlation was expected between “BLUE victory” and “BLUE casualties” the 
nearly perfect correlation between infantry casualties and total casualties shows 
that infantry casualties are the major part of the whole casualties, and whenever 
casualties get heavy there is also a high number of infantry killed. The final result 
from this analysis is that the MOE “BLUE victory” and “BLUE infantry casualties” 





Figure 23.  Correlation between MOEs. If a RED line is nearly horizontal, no 
significant correlation occurs. If it increases, it is positively correlated; 
if it decreases, it is negatively correlated. 
  
 85 
4. Factor Screening 
In the following sections, the major contributors to the MOEs, including 
interaction and non-linear effects, are examined to find accurate meta-models. 
For more practical use and explanation, the number of included factors should be 
minimized. The regression techniques used are based on the principal to 
minimize the sum of square errors (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012) by fitting 
the factors to an appropriate model. Regression basically fits a mathematical 
model with the input factors or independent variables so that the squared 
distances to all observed data points are minimized. 
a. Main Effect Models 
The first regression technique used is to fit simple main effect 
models for the MOEs. The reasoning behind this is that main effect models are 
easy to understand and interpret. The main effect models gained in several 
iterations are shown in Figures 24 through 26.  The “summary of fit” tables give a 
value to how much observed variance is explained by the regression model, or 
more simply, how good the model fits the observations. The “sorted parameter” 
table shows the model itself. Each factor used is listed in the “term” column; its 
multiplier is stated in the “estimate” column together with an involved uncertainty 
stated in the “Std Error” column. The “t-ratio” and the “Prob > ItI” columns give 
statistical values if the term is necessary in the model. For example, the “Blue 
casualties” model estimates the number of infantry (= “inf”) on a GCV as the most 
significant factor. If the number is increased by 1 the “Estimate” value of 
2.16 says that the BLUE casualty expectance is increased by 2.16 agents. As 




Figure 24.  The main effect models for BLUE and RED casualties. 
 
 




Figure 26.  The main effect models for the GCV casualties. 
b. Analysis of Main Effect Models 
As can be seen from the “Summary of Fits” the R-square values 
are very low. The interpretation is that even when all underlying factors are 
known the outcome and duration of the battle cannot be predicted as only 4–14% 
of the variance can be explained. This issue is resolved by calculating the mean 
response for each MOE. From Appendix D it can be seen that to use the  
means raised the explanatory power of the model with only main effects already 
to 78–87% of the variability. 
For the MOE “BLUE casualties” it is unclear why the BLUE 
casualties would rise when the “TOW” range is increased. As no error in the 
model could be found the author decided to conduct 1000 additional replications 
of the simulation in which only the TOW range varied. The result is that the TOW 
range has nearly no effect on the BLUE casualty level, which only showed a 
slight decrease. It would seem that especially for weak relationships between 
MOEs and factors, random effects can cause a small type I error. This means 
that a factor can be added through random effects—even with the wrong sign—
to a regression model when there is no significant relationship. When more 
replications are done, errors happen less often, but absolute certainty cannot be 
achieved.  
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On the other hand, for the MOEs where TOW range is a more important 
factor (as it is for “RED casualties” or “CGV casualties”) it can be seen that the 
sign of the factor and its influence is logical and in the right direction. To take this 
into account only the most important and influential factors are considered in the 
following regression models. 
c. Most Important Main Effects 
Number of BLUE infantry carried: The most important contributing 
factor for BLUE casualties is the number of BLUE infantry brought to the battle. It 
is counterintuitive that a higher number of available infantry raises the number of 
overall BLUE casualties. Responsible for the effect is the scenario itself. As the 
RED forces have a high quantity of indirect fire available and can use their long 
range anti-tank weapons on infantry, more BLUE infantry means that the RED 
agents have a greater number of vulnerable targets. Of course, the number of 
RED casualties increases with more BLUE infantry available, so the effect on the 
casualty ratio is not as strong as it is for BLUE casualties. Overall, this factor is 
considered heavily scenario dependent. 
Detection of vehicles and infantry for the GCV: The most significant 
factors for decreasing BLUE casualties are better sensors on the GCV. Better 
sensors enable the GCVs to detect, report, and engage the enemy faster and to 
increase the situational awareness of all BLUE agents. Therefore, the sensor 
quality is also one of the most influential factors for decreasing the battle 
duration. Considering only RED casualties, the ability to detect infantry clearly 
dominates the vehicle sensor effects as most of the RED agents are infantry 
soldiers. Surprisingly, better sensors do not have much influence on the 
survivability of the GCV itself. Here, other factors dominate the model. The 
reason for this is that the basic sensor is already good enough for self-protection, 
but not for providing covering fire for other units as this requires longer distance 
detections. 
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Concealment: One important battle parameter is the ability of the 
GCV to hide. As expected, it decreases the GCV casualty expectance. The 
marked decrease in overall BLUE casualty expectance shows how important the 
combined action of infantry carrier and supported infantry proves in the scenario. 
Similarly, casualties of the infantry decrease drastically with better survivability of 
the GCV and so does the BLUE casualty ratio. Interestingly, concealment has 
the most influence on battle duration. The reason for this is that the BLUE forces 
are able to avoid detection by RED and therefore can reach the objective without 
having to destroy every RED battle position. Notice that this is the reason why 
the RED casualty expectance decreases with a higher concealment rate. 
Mortar: Another important contributor for improving the GCV 
performance for all considered MOEs is the addition of an advanced indirect fire 
capacity. Area fire without delay proves to be the most important main effect for 
RED casualties and for the casualty ratio. With this additional firepower BLUE 
casualties can be avoided and the battle duration decreased. 
Number of hits for the GCV: As the model shows, the “robustness” 
of a GCV against enemy fire is most important as it is unavoidable that the GCVs 
get hit. As the GCV make up only a small part of the overall BLUE force, the 
influence on the total BLUE casualties and the casualty ratio is not significant. 
For the survivability of the GCV this is the most contributing factor. 
Active defense measures: Notice that this factor is modeled as 
reduced anti-tank kill probability. This means a higher value decreases the active 
defense effectiveness, and the model parameter must be multiplied by minus 
one. Active defense measures have effects similar to the number of hits. 
Therefore, it can be modeled as a combined factor in future studies. 
TOW: In the scenario, long-range weapon capabilities prove to be 
important. For the CGV, the survivability is dependent on the range advantage 
against enemy infantry, and therefore, the TOW helps to increase enemy 
casualties and reduced casualties on the GCV side. 
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All other factors are not as important. Notice that the “BLUE 
casualties,” “RED casualties,” the “casualty ratio” and the “battle duration” can be 
considered as MOEs for the system of systems (that is, the whole BLUE force), 
while the “GCV casualty” MOE is different as it directly measures the survivability 
of the GCV. Here, factors like armor and speed of the GCVs are important while 
they are not for the other MOEs. 
5. Insights 
The conclusion from the R-square value analysis is that it is impossible to 
predict the outcome of a battle even when all factors are known. The variance 
caused by agent interactions and the influence of randomness are much greater 
than superior numbers or better specification parameters of the GCV. As the 
behavior of the agents’ shows great similarity to actual human behavior, it is a 
major insight that even with the best knowledge of the enemy and our own forces 
(including intangibles such as leadership) a battle outcome cannot be predicted 
for sure. Instead, as the “mean” regression model showed, it is possible to 
determine the odds of a battle. The approach historians typically take to look at a 
single battle and find the factors for victory and failure can therefore be doubted.  
Additionally, the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: 
• The used tactic of dismount immediately when under fire or spot 
the enemy greatly increased the expected casualty rate, if the 
enemy had a sufficient amount and accuracy of indirect fire.  
• Improved sensor quality of one system combined with network 
capabilities can greatly enhance the performance of the whole force 
according to casualty expectance and battle duration. 
• Advanced concealment technologies promise to be able to avoid 
ambushes and could enable our own forces to take objectives in 
much less time with fewer casualties. It can also prove useful for 
improving convoy security while conducting logistics operations. 
• Against infantry in prepared positions, indirect, organic fire 
capability is a great advantage.   
• Even with the best armor, the best defense system, and the best 
tactics, it is unavoidable that sometimes the enemy hits a GCV in a 
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vulnerable location. The “robustness” of a GCV is important to 
minimize losses and improve mission performance.  
• System of systems MOEs behave differently than the directly 
measured MOE for just one system like the GCV. 
As the estimation of the factors for the MOE does not change by using the 
MOE means as dependent variables, all other analysis is done by using the 
mean data. 
6. Partition Trees 
Partition trees are a different tool for analyzing the most influential factors. 
Here, the factor as a whole is not considered, but the algorithm tries to split the 
factors at a certain value so that the most variance can be explained by this 
division, and the errors are reduced. The advantage of this approach is that it 
allows for finding critical values for designing a weapon system.  
a. “BLUE Casualty” Partition Tree 
In Figure 27, it can be seen that if the sensor for vehicles can be 
improved to 150% effectiveness the BLUE casualty expectance goes down from 
23 agents killed to only 20 per battle (a 15% reduction). Another critical threshold 
value is to improve the sensor at least to 120% effectiveness. The tree diagram 
gives also the most influential factors according to the split sequence. The 
percentage of explained variance with each splitting can be seen in Figure 28. As 
the increase of the curve flattens out after six splits only these six are considered.  
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Figure 27.  Partition tree for BLUE casualties. 
 
Figure 28.  History of split for BLUE casualties; the black vertical line shows the 
number of used splits. 
Graphs and statistics for the other MOEs can be found in Appendix D. 
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b. Most Important Main Effects 
In comparison with the most important factors from the main effects 
models a high correlation can be observed with the partition tree models. The 
two (in most cases three) most influential factors are the same. Therefore, the 
results in the previous chapter are confirmed. Conclusions from the partition 
trees are sorted according to MOEs.  
BLUE casualties: The result for the two most influential factors, 
“number of infantry carried” and “sensor for vehicles,” match up with the main 
effects model. As stated before, two critical threshold values can be identified for 
the effectiveness of the sensor. An additional insight is that the importance of the 
long-range TOW and the importance of the EW depend on the sensor quality for 
vehicles. It is logical that a better long-range weapon system is only effective 
when the according sensor has the same range. If this is not the case, for 
example due weather conditions, other factors like EW can be more efficient in 
reducing casualties. 
RED casualties: For this MOE the three most important factors, 
“mortar,” “detection of infantry” and “number of hits,” matches up with the main 
effects model. Depending on whether an indirect fire weapon is added to the 
GCV there can be two threshold values identified for the infantry sensors. This 
result emphasizes again the correlation between weapon system range and 
corresponding sensor. 
Casualty ratio: For the casualty ratio both tools give as the most 
important factors the “indirect fire weapon,” the “infantry sensor effectiveness” 
and the GCV “concealment.” Regardless of whether the indirect fire weapon is 
installed on the GCVs there is a threshold level for the “infantry sensor,” but 
depending on the existence of the weapon both thresholds differ.  
Battle duration: As the three most influential factors match up again 
(“concealment,” “sensor effectiveness for vehicles,” “indirect fire weapon”) the 
previous result could be confirmed. Times to reach an objective in the scenario 
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are highly correlated to the ability of avoiding contact with the enemy and the 
survivability of the GCVs. 
GCV casualties: Again, the three most influential factors (“number 
of hits,” “active defense,” “armor”) are confirmed. An additional insight is that if 
the GCV is not robust (= can take only one hit) “armor thickness” is the second 
most influential factor. If, by contrast, the vehicle can take more hits on average, 
“active defense” means become more relevant.  
7. Interaction Regression Models 
The next step in the analysis is to consider the effects of interactions 
between the main effects and non-linear dependencies. The problem here is the 
limited number of “degrees of freedoms” (DF) in the used DOE. The 65 design 
points translated to 63 DF since two are used for estimating mean and error.  
Pre-analysis shows that linear effects are mostly sufficient, but quadratic 
effects should be considered, as shown in Table 11.  
Table 11.   Non-linear effects: An “X” indicates that the factor is considered with 
quadratic effects for the corresponding MOE. 
 conceal speed armor #inf Detinf DetVeh Bush MG TOW CW EW AD 
BLUE 
cas 
X    X        
RED cas X  X  X     X X  
Cas ratio X           X 
Battle 
time 
X           X 
GCV cas   X        X X 
 
The pre-analysis also shows that interaction terms are highly influential 
and must be considered. Due to the limited number of DF, the following models 
take into consideration the seven most influential main effects up to three-way 
interactions, which uses the maximum of 63 DF.  
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The general sequence for finding the advanced regression model is as 
follows: 
• Use the main effects and the squares.  
• Use main effects, significant square terms, and two-way 
interactions. 
• Use main effects, significant square terms and two/three-way 
interactions on a reduced number of main factors (usually the 
seven most influential main effects). 
• Compare and find the “best” models according to the 𝑅2 and 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗2  
values.  
In the selection process, the number of factors in the model is tried to be 
reduced as the purpose is to find the most influential factors. Therefore, if a 
model has only slightly higher 𝑅2 and 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗2  values by adding an additional factor, 
the factor is left out. Furthermore, the threshold for explained variance has been 
chosen to be 80% or above. If interactions or quadratic terms become part of the 
model the author chose to leave the corresponding main effects also in the 
model as it keeps the model hierarchical. 
For the MOE “BLUE casualties” the model is explained in the following 
section. An “Actual by Predicted Plot” is shown in Figure 29. This plot gives a 




Figure 29.  Predicted mean of the BLUE casualties (RED line) against the 
observed means (gray crosses). The dotted BLUE line shows the 
overall mean of the BLUE casualties for the total 29900 runs. 
The model fits the observed means very well as can be seen in Figure 30. 
There are no outliers, and the model has a high predictive power in the observed 
range. Notice that the examined factor ranges are chosen according to the 
maximum possible values in reality, which means that the results are valid for 
any kind of GCV development in the next decade. 
 
Figure 30.  Summary fit of the “BLUE casualties” model; the 𝑹𝟐 shows that 92 % 
of the variance is explained by the fitted meta-model and the 
corresponding 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐  value shows that only important factors are 
included as the difference between them is small. 
The advanced regression model with all its factors displayed in the 
sequence of their importance is shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31.  Model parameter estimates of the “BLUE casualties.” 
Another useful analysis tool is the prediction profiler. The prediction 
profiler illustrates the variability of the MOE according to changes in the main 
effects as shown in Figure 32. If the bend of the BLUE curve or the angle of 
BLUE lines is high then the MOE values react sensitively to changes in the 
corresponding main effect. 
 
Figure 32.  Prediction profiler. Shown are the seven main effects used in the 
previous model. The x-axis shows the value of each main effect and 
the y-axis the value of the mean BLUE casualties. The blue line 
represents the actual change of the MOE with the corresponding main 
effect. The dotted lines giving a 95% confidence interval. Red dotted 
lines represent the overall mean values of the MOE and the 
corresponding effects. 
Figure 32 shows additionally that the main effect has not changed in 
comparison with the previous models. The result of the pre-analysis is confirmed 
as the model shows the quadratic relation between MOE and concealment is 
highly significant. It also can be seen that interactions are included in the model. 
 98 
The advanced model explains 92% of the variance in contrast to the 85% for the 
main effects model and increases 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐  from 0.8 to 0.9 while reducing the 
included number of terms from 14 to 13. 
The number of terms to be included can be chosen freely. More terms 
always increase the 𝑅2value. So a “Pareto Plot” such as the one shown in Figure 
33 and the 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐 values are used to restrict the number of terms to only the most 
influential ones. Note that after the TOW main effect, the curve in Figure 33 
flattens out, so no additional terms are added to the model. 
 
Figure 33.  Pareto plot showing (blue line) how much additional variance can be 
explained by adding a new factor.  
8. Insights 
Interactions (even three-way) matter and therefore must be considered in 
the specification process. Even when there are more important main effects the 
overall performance of a GCV is also dependent on interactions. Whenever a 
system is tested, these interactions must be quantified as part of the vehicle 
evaluation and taken into consideration when changes are applied. 
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Of particular significance is the factor of concealment. Concealment of the 
GCV changes the MOE with a non-linear, probably quadratic, relationship. This 
factor is especially useful in the scenario to reduce casualties when applied in 
combination with electronic warfare and long-range weapon systems. The reason 
for this combination is that single enemy agents can detect the concealed GCV 
for short time periods. When this agent is not able to provide the information to 
his allies no coordinated action can be taken against the GCV, and the 
concealed CGV is able to destroy or evade other RED agents still not aware that 
the GCV is in range. Therefore, the effect of concealment is multiplied. 
The advanced regression models for the other MOEs are given in 
Appendix E, and only an overview of the results is represented in Table 12.   
Table 12.   Overview of advanced regression models for infantry carrier GCV. A 
confirmation of the main effects result is considered when the 
sequence of the main effects has not changed. Corresponding 𝑹𝟐 
and 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐 values from the main effects regression model are shown. 




 Main effect  
𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐  
RED Cas 0.94 0.93 13 Yes 0.86 0.82 
Cas ratio 0.84 0.80 13 Yes 0.77 0.71 
Battle 
time 
0.82 0.78 10 No 0.78 0.70 
GCV cas 0.96 0.95 13 Yes 0.82 0.76 
 
Several findings emerge from the advanced regression models. In the case of 
“RED casualties,” “casualty ratio,” and “Battle time” (duration), concealment has 







• Concealment has again a quadratic relationship with the MOE. 
• The robustness of the GCV interacts with the longer range of the 
main “TOW” weapon and is one of the most influential factors to 
increase RED casualties. This interaction is more important than 
“TOW” range alone and shows the importance of interaction 
between survivability and lethality for inflicting damage to the 
enemy. 
“Casualty ratio” 
• “Concealment” has again a quadratic relationship with the MOE. 
• “Concealment” appears in most relevant interactions. It is more 
important in interactions with “EW,” “Mortar,” and “active defense.” 
This means that the effect of “concealment” on the casualty ratio 
can be increased if the own force survivability and lethality is higher 
and the enemy communication abilities are decreased.  This result 
also confirms the previous found relationship between 
“concealment” and “EW.” 
“Battle time” 
• “Concealment” has a quadratic relationship with the MOE 
• The sequence for the main effect is not the same as in the pure 
main effect model. Now “mortar” and “detection of infantry” have 
increased influence, while the influence of “concealment” 
decreased. The “number of GCV hits” is no longer relevant. 
• “Concealment” shows again importance of interactions with 
“mortar,” “EW” and “active defense.” 
“GCV casualties” 
• The most influential factors for the survivability of the GCV are 
confirmed with “robustness of a vehicle,” the “quality of the active 
defense,” and its “armor.” Also, the lethality against anti-tank 
weapons increases its survivability. The regression model shows 
that the entire main “survivability factors” mentioned above have 








Among the conclusions drawn in regard to the models are the following: 
• All models are checked if they have any outliers in their prediction. 
Only for the “Battle duration” MOE can one outlier be identified, 
which gives the author a high confidence in the correctness of the 
regression models in catching the interdependencies of the 
conducted combat simulation.  
• All final regression models have greater explanatory power than the 
main effect counterparts with fewer factors included as can be seen 
in Table 12.  Therefore, interactions and non-linearities matter and 
must be addressed in the specification process. 
• All advanced regression models confirm the sequence of the main 
effects in order of their importance besides the “Battle duration” 
model. Here, the order changed slightly but still confirmed the basic 
insights. 
10. Robust Solution 
The last step is to find a robust solution for the specification parameters 
for the GCV.  
No simulation can exactly predict the future and even the best underlying 
scenarios for specifications will not look like the environment the GCV will face in 
the real world. Therefore, the predicted performance for the found influential 
factors will also not match up with the real performance. To take this into 
account, a tradeoff between overall performance and the variability of the result 
must be made. Notice that the variance for the MOEs can also be called 
“uncertainty of the MOE.” This means that the regression model of the variance 
can be used to see what factors contribute most to the uncertainty of the MOE. 
To come up with a robust solution for specifications the decision maker 
must define how he or she wants to weigh the different MOEs and how to weigh 
the likelihood of all underlying scenarios. If there are three different scenarios the 
most influential factors will differ from scenario to scenario. While in a 
conventional war scenario “speed” can be influential this must not be the case if 
the scenario deploys the GCVs on fixed check points. 
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For the purpose of this study the process is shown for one scenario and 
the MOE “GCV casualties.” This choice is made because for a specification 
process MOEs measuring direct performance are easier to understand than 
indirect MOEs. 
The found regression model equation for “GCV casualties” is 
“GCV casualties” = 0.9233 - 0.4125 * “3hits” + 0.6334 * “actDef” - 0.7409 * 
“3hits” * “actDef” - 0.0005 * “armor” + 0.3637 * “3hits” * “TOW” - 0.2660* “TOW” + 
0.0004 * ”3hits” * “armor” - 0.9130 * “TOW” * “actDef”  + 1.4748 * “hits” * “TOW” * 
“actDef” - 0.0017 * “conceal” - 0.0566*"2hits"- 0.0010* "conceal" * "mortar" + 
0.0240 * "No mortar" 
 
The regression model for the variance of the MOE “GCV casualties” is 
Variance (“GCV casualties”) = 0.9399 - 0.3957 * “3hits” - 0.0007 * “armor” + 
0.5937 * “actDef” - 0.3324 * “TOW” + 0.0004 * “3hits”*”armor” - 0.2880 * “3hits” * 
“actDef” - 0.0019 * “conceal” + 0.2151 * “3hits” * “TOW” - 0.0643 * “2hits” + 0.049 
* “No mortar” - 0.4318 * “TOW” * “actDef” * 0.0063 * “speed” 
 
Now both must be combined by a so-called “loss-function.” The idea is 
that a higher performance with a higher variance might not be as desirable as a 
slightly lower performance with a lower variance. Lower variance means that the 
result will be more stable. The combined loss-function can be chosen according 
to the practical problem. Here, there is no loss associated with fewer casualties. 
Therefore, loss will only occur when the casualties are higher and a one sided 
loss-function is appropriate. How this loss-function is chosen depends on the 
situation and on the preference of the analyst (P. Sanchez, 2010). 
11. Results 
The author followed the outlined approach and found that with a higher 
performance the variance is decreasing. There is nearly a perfect, positive 




Figure 34.  Correlation between GCV variance and casualty GCV MOE. Note that 
the scatterplot shows that when the casualty rate of the GCVs 
increases the variance also increases. A perfect correlation would 
have the value of 1 and would be represented as a bisecting line in 
the first quadrant. 
The consequence is that no loss function is needed. Whenever the 
performance is higher, the variance decreases. If this is the case for all combat 
simulations, it is beyond the scope of the thesis; but it emphasizes the result 
found by Hillestad that the variance of the combat simulation results decreases if 
the setup increasingly departs from a draw situation (Hillestad, Owen, & 
Blumenthal, 1995). A closer analysis of the factors shows that this is especially 
true for the number of hits the GCV has, which has been determined before as 
the most influential factor for the variance. The graph in Figure 35 shows how not 




Figure 35.  Impact of GCV hits on variance. The x-axis shows the three levels of 
hits the GCV has. The box-plot whiskers show how variable the 
solution is and the horizontal line gives the mean of the GCV 
casualties. 
To sum it up, the better the performance of the GCVs, the more “robust” 
the solution is. This result helps for the future work on the engineering side of the 
specification process as the engineers need only address the performance MOE 
as this automatically reduces the variance. This finding also simplifies the 
implementation of the thesis results in the “dashboard.” 
C. ANALYSIS CGV: MAIN BATTLE TANKS 
As in the previous chapter, the same analysis is done when substituting 
the Abrams main battle tank platoon into the scenario. There are two reasons for 
this analysis method: 
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• First, the additional analysis is needed to see if the used analysis 
approach holds for different situations and to gain additional 
insights. 
• Second, the German government plans to build a new main battle 
tank, and the author plans to use this data and approach for the 
concept development of this new “tank GCV.” 
1. Correlation of the MOEs 
From the chosen MOE a correlation matrix is calculated to see if some 
MOEs can be combined. As the GCVs carry no infantry, the “infantry casualty” 
MOE is not considered. For the remaining six MOEs the result is shown in Table 
13.  The threshold for high correlation is set again to 0.7, where red text indicates 
high correlation. Therefore, the MOE for “BLUE victories” and “casualty ratio” are 
combined this time within the MOE “BLUE casualties,” and “Sqd7 Cas” 
represents the casualties of the GCVs.  
Table 13.   Correlation table. The table shows the correlation between the six 
MOEs. The RED color shows high correlation. “Sqd7 Cas” 
represents the casualties of the GCVs 
 
2. Factor Screening 
The following sections examine the major contributing factors for 
the four remaining MOEs and will explore the interactions and non-linear effects 
contributing to these MOEs. The number of included factors in the resulting 
meta-models is minimized for better practical and explanatory usage. 
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a. Main Effect Model 
The main effect models are found with the same approach as 
before. The results are displayed in Figure 34–Figure 37. Additional graphs are 
provided in Appendix G. 
 













































b. Most important Main Effects 
Active defense measures: The overall most influential factor for the 
four MOEs is “actDef.” It contributes to each MOE significantly. Good active 
defensive systems increase the survivability of the GCV. As the tank GCV has a 
high lethality its higher survivability enables it to kill more enemy agents and to 
draw more enemy fire; so, the overall “BLUE casualties” are reduced, and the 
number of “RED casualties” increases. With a greater advantage for the BLUE 
forces the battle duration is reduced. The author found the same relationships for 
the survivability factors “hits” and “armor.” 
Concealment: As they were for the infantry carrier, concealment 
measures are a major contributor to overall battlefield performance. BLUE “CGV 
casualties” and “BLUE overall casualties” are slightly reduced. Interestingly, a 
higher concealment rate also reduced the number of “RED casualties” and the 
“battle duration” significantly. The reason for this effect is again that the BLUE 
CGV is able to avoid contact and therefore leaves enemy agents behind while 
reaching its objective faster. So the previous observation for the infantry carrier is 
confirmed. 
Detection of vehicles and infantry for the GCV: Again, a better 
sensor system has an important effect on the performance of the GCV, but it is 
much less significant than it was for the infantry carrier CGV. In general the 
findings for the infantry carrier can be confirmed; but as the tank already has 
better sensors in comparison to the infantry carrier, the increase in the ranges 
and the probabilities of detection are not as important.  
Mortar: The addition of an organic indirect fire is again the most 
significant contributing factor for “RED casualties.” It also influences “battle 
duration” and “BLUE casualties” significantly. The previous results for the infantry 




In general, the author finds that the same factors contribute to the 
survivability of an infantry carrier GCV as they do for a main battle tank GCV. 
However, the importance of specific factors differs. Therefore, additional studies 
can be done to see if performance parameters are scenario dependent or 
whether they depend more on the purpose of the vehicle in the scenario. If the 
parameters are mostly scenario dependent, the chosen “most-likely” scenarios 
would already define most of the important performance factors. Notice that the 
“number of infantry carried” is an important factor for an infantry carrying GCV, 
but this factor is not applicable at all for a battle tank. In addition the infantry-
carrier GCV improvements in the long-range weapons matter, while 
improvements to the “120mm” gun of the tank GCV do not because the tank 
already has superior firepower. 
Additionally, the author arrived at the following insights: 
• In a comparison of the infantry carrier and the battle tank GCV it 
can be shown that the significance of the improvement of a factor is 
dependent on its previous level of importance. For example, it 
might not be cost efficient to increase the performance of an 
already excellent detection system. To improve or eliminate known 
weaknesses of the previous system class vehicles is more 
important. So the “Pareto principle” applies in the specification 
process of the GCV, and non-linear effects must be covered as well 
in an analysis.  
• Major performance parameters are dependent on the scenario and 




4. Partition Tree Analysis 
Graphics and statistics related to the partition tree analysis discussed in 
this section can be found in Appendix H.  
The partition tree analysis confirms the main effect results. 
“BLUE casualties:” The model shows that influential factors such as 
“mortar” are strongly dependent on the value of the active defense. If a strong 
active defense is installed, the GCV significantly increases the BLUE force 
survivability by improving vehicle sensors and adding an indirect fire weapon. 
“RED casualties:” The partition tree indicates that depending on 
whether an indirect fire weapon is installed, the influence of an active defense 
system and the camouflage ability of the GCV varies. If the GCV has an indirect 
fire weapon and is able to move within range of the RED infantry, the number of 
“RED casualties” is significantly increased. Otherwise, protection against long-
range anti-tank weapon systems becomes more important, and the fight is 
conducted at longer ranges.   
“GCV casualties:” Here, the influence of the most straightforward 
factors (that is, “number of hits,” “armor” and “actDef”) is confirmed as the most 
significant for survivability. The partition tree model shows that, depending on the 
robustness of a vehicle, different thresholds for armor thickness can be 
considered to improve the vehicle’s performance and that the best protection 
results from a mix of armor and robust design. 
5. Interaction Regression Models 
To find influential quadratic effects a pre-analysis is conducted on 





Table 14.   Result of pre-analysis scanning for quadratic relationships between 
MOEs and main effects 
 conceal speed armor #inf Detinf DetVeh Bush MG TOW CW EW AD 
BLUE 
cas 
 X           
RED 
cas 
X X           
Battle 
time 
X    X X      X 
GCV 
cas 
X          X  
 
For the advanced regression models non-linear factors, together 
with the seven most influential main effects, up to their three-way interactions are 
considered. The regression models are shown in Appendix I, and the main 
statistics are given in Table 15.  Notice that each model has been able to achieve 
a higher explanatory power than the 13 factor main effects model and with fewer 
factors. So, the importance of the non-linear effects and their interactions is 
confirmed. Furthermore, the non-linear regression model predicted the mean 
MOE outcomes very well. Only the “battle duration” MOE shows one outlier. 
Table 15.   Overview of the final regression models for the “tank” GCV. A  
confirmation of the main effect result is considered when the sequence 
of the main affects has not changed. The last two columns show  
the corresponding 𝑹𝟐 and 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐  values from the main effects  
regression model. 
 𝑹𝟐 𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋𝟐  # of parameter 




 Main effect  
𝑹𝒂𝒅𝒋
𝟐  
BLUE Cas 0.93 0.92 8 Yes 0.92 0.90 
RED Cas 0.90 0.89 8 Yes 0.89 0.86 
Battle 
duration 
0.92 0.91 11 Yes 0.88 0.84 





a. “BLUE Casualties” 
• The regression confirmed the results from the main 
effects model. It also showed that the performance of 
an additional indirect fire weapon depends on the 
effectiveness of the active defense systems of the 
GCV. If the survivability rate of the GCV is higher at 
close ranges the GCV can get into effective mortar 
range to engage the enemy. If the enemy anti-tank 
weapons are effective, “tank” GCV should use their 
range advantage with their main gun to destroy the 
enemy at long ranges to reduce GCV casualties. 
b. “RED Casualties” 
• As shown in the pre-analysis, the influence of 
concealment on the MOE is quadratic. 
• The dependency of the indirect fire weapon 
performance on the quality of the active defense 
systems can be shown again. Therefore, not only is 
the BLUE force casualty rate reduced from a 
combination of indirect fire and active defense 
system, but also the number of RED agents killed is 
increased. 
c. “Battle Duration” 
• The pre-analysis result for the non-linear effect on the 
MOE for “concealment” and “DetInf” is confirmed. 
• A dependency between the concealment ability and 
the sensor quality can be deduced from the 
regression model. This relationship emphasizes the 
importance of superior situation awareness as the 
GCVs are able to detect the enemy without being 
seen themselves. Therefore, the GCVs are able to 
destroy the enemy while maintaining a high 
survivability rate themselves or to avoid contact with 
the enemy entirely and reach the mission goal earlier. 
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d. “GCV Casualties” 
• The model gives the expected result that the main 
components of survivability are “robustness,” “armor” 
and “actDef.” The additional consideration is that 
there are interactions between all these factors so 
that none of these can be considered separately.   
 
7. Summary 
• All non-linear models kept the sequence of the main 
effects models and the partition trees. This fact shows 
that the meta-models are stable and indicates that the 
found influential factors are correct. 
• The results emphasize the importance of non-linear 
and interaction effects which must be studied to 
develop an optimal specification set. 
 
8. Robust Solution 
The analysis of the robust solution follows the same steps used for the 
infantry GCV. As the study showed before, the variance of the MOE “CGV 
casualties” is almost perfectly correlated with the performance. The correlation is 
shown in Figure 40. This result gives additional evidence that the “robust” 














Figure 40.  Correlation scatterplot: The x-axis shows the variance and the y-axis 




All findings are based on the underlying scenario and the agent-based 
software MANA that was used. So, there is no proof that all conclusions are 
confirmed in reality, but the author is confident that the stated findings can be 
generalized and will match up with results from real field testing.  
A. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
The first and most important conclusion is that the chosen approach is 
feasible for land based systems. The robustness of the regression results and 
the constancy of the insights for different methods and models, as well as 
different GCV types, have shown that the method is repeatable under different 
circumstances and will lead to the same conclusions. Furthermore, the most 
influential factors for each MOE could be identified and explained. The approach 
cannot guarantee an optimal solution, but it can give additional insights and 
direct research and specifications development. A proof can only be conducted if 
the results are tested under real combat conditions, which is far out of the scope 
of this thesis.  
One of the leading research questions addressed by this thesis was 
whether the interactions between factors matters. So far, these interactions are 
not considered in any specification process currently used. The study finds that 
even when no specific interaction is the most influential factor for a MOE, results 
were dependent on interactions. Nearly all of the influential interactions are two-
way interactions, but also some three-way interactions were found.  
Another question this thesis answered was which factors contribute most 
to the survivability of the GCV under the given conditions. The study shows not 
only the most influential parameters, but also finds evidence that there is a strong 
interaction between them and they must be related to one another (Appendix F). 
Additionally, the study finds evidence that the most influential factors for 
overall performance of a ground combat system are heavily dependent on the 
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scenario used. So, there could be some basic requirements for a given scenario 
which can be shared by all deployed assets and systems to increase the 
performance of the whole force. 
Another argument for using the suggested specification approach is that 
the study found non-linear relationships between MOEs and factors. These non-
linearities are especially hard to foresee if the specification process is based on 
subject matter expert inputs or battlefield experiences. For example the quadratic 
relationship for concealment with the MOE “RED casualties” would probably not 
being addressed by judgment and experience alone. 
Finally, the author concludes that the specification process can be 
improved by implementing the suggested approach in the current process as an 
additional element. 
B. INSIGHT INTO PREDICTED OUTCOMES 
Besides finding the answers to the research questions, the author as a 
student of military history discovered an additional major insight while conducting 
the analysis. Even with the knowledge of all important battlefield factors like 
terrain, weather, training levels, equipment deployed, tactics and so on, it is not 
possible to predict the outcome of a battle. The author can control all these 
“hard” factors, but the regression models still have minimal explanatory power. 
The reason is that the variance introduced by the random behavior of the agents 
(humans)—even when it is controlled by fixed rules (orders)—has much greater 
influence than bare numbers. So, the models cannot predict the outcome of a 
single battle, but they can give insight into the odds of winning.  
Historians look at one data point (battle) and infer from there the reasons 
for success or failure, which they see in a summary of factors including 
leadership and motivation. While there is no doubt that this analysis is useful and 
can give insights, the author claims that even with all the factors known, the 
historians are not able to predict a battle’s outcome. In fact, it is much more likely 
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that inferior forces have won battles in history just by randomness and luck than 
is commonly considered.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author recommends that the outlined approach be used in the 
preliminary analysis to define specifications and also in cases where 
specifications must be altered. Specifically, the outlined approach should be used 
in conjunction with the already existing process rather than as a substitute. The 
field testing, subject matter expert input, combat simulation tests, and battlefield 
experience currently used provide essential insights. The more information there 
is available before the specifications are translated into prototype development, 
the more savings in time and money can be achieved, and the better the final 
performance of the GCV will be. Therefore, the approach should be implemented 
as part of the Department of Defense specification process. 
Regardless of which tools are used for finding the specifications of a 
ground system, it is recommended that at least two-way interactions and non-
linear effects be considered as this study showed that they matter. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The author acknowledges that this study is not exhaustive and that 
several aspects of this work can serve as the basis for future research. As a 
starting point, future research could verify the findings by using different 
scenarios with the same analysis methods. It would be beneficial to see if the 
basic conclusions hold in these scenarios and to confirm that major requirements 
are dependent on the scenario.  
Specifically, the author recommends the following approaches for future 
research: 
• Examine different peacekeeping scenarios and focus on different 
weapon systems to see if their performance depends on similar 
factors. The final result could be a list of basic requirements for 
different kind of scenarios to influence future force structures. 
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• Determine whether the conclusions of this study can be confirmed 
for the same scenario using a physics-based, high-resolution 
application such as Combat XXI. (MANA, which was used for our 
study, is a low resolution model.) 
• Use an advanced tool to visualize the tradeoffs between different 
factors and MOEs. Such a tool will soon be available. One of the 
outputs of this thesis is to provide a meta-model for the “dashboard” 
to be implemented by the Systems Engineering Department at 
NPS. Results will help direct the discussion of the specification 
process and improve the overall performance of future ground 
combat systems. 
Note: the developed scenario has been used in the capstone project for 
the SE311 Vehicle Survivability course at the NPS engineering 
department. (Vehicle Survivability Team & Cohort 311-114G, 2013).  
  
 121 
APPENDIX A. VEHICLE SURVIVABILITY FACTOR LIST 
The following vehicle survivability factor list (Vehicle Survivability Team & 
Cohort 311-114G, 2013) is provided to enable a fast comparison of the factors 
that are considered in this thesis and those which are omitted. The list provides a 
base for future research and the exploration of additional factors using the 
described approach.   
Manage System States 
Transition between States 





Avoid Hit / Activation of Threat 
Avoid Penetration 
Avoid Kill / Incapacitation 
Protect Personnel 
Protect Against Acceleration Effects 
Protect Against Fragments 
Protect Against Blast Effects 
Protect Against CBRN 
Protect Against Fires 


























Enable Common Situational Understanding 
Enable Vision 









Guide Ammunition to Target 
Deliver Ammunition to Weapons 
Track Ammunition Status 
Control Weapons 
Host Weapons 
Manage Weapon Recoil/Impact 
Manage Weapon Biproducts 
Power Vehicle 
Generate Electrical Power 
Generate Mechanical Power 













APPENDIX B. DETAILS OF BASIC SCENARIO RUN,  
1000 REPLICATIONS 
The histograms in this appendix provide additional information about the 
scenario behavior for the military experienced reader and are important to 
show the validity of the results. For every agent class the number and type 












Figure 43.  Histogram of BLUE infantry kills and casualties.  
 
Figure 44.  Histogram of 109A6 Paladin kills. The artillery is not in reach of enemy 
forces, so no casualties occur. 
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Figure 45.  Histogram of M1 Abrams kills and casualties.  
 
 
Figure 46.  Histogram of RAVEN UAV casualties. As the RAVEN has no weapon 
systems, no kills of enemy weapon systems occur. 
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Figure 47.  Histogram of IED detection. Notice that detection through artillery 
represents detection through any other asset as artillery has no 
sensors of its own. It is stated in the histogram as artillery since it is 
used to destroy the IEDs which represents the detection and 
clearance in the simualtion.  
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Figure 48.  Histogram of mines detection and kills. 
 




Figure 50.  Histogram of RED AGS30 casualties and kills.  
 
 
Figure 51.  Histogram of RED HQ casualties. 
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Figure 52.  Histogram of RED infantry casualties and kills.  
 
Figure 53.  Histogram of RED 120 mm mortar casualties and kills.  
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Figure 54.  Histogram of RED MILAN casualties and kills.  
 




Figure 56.  Histogram of RED T90M casualties and kills.  
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APPENDIX C. DOE FOR INFANTRY CARRIER GCV 
The DOE spreadsheet used for the infantry carrier GCV is shown below. 
The spreadsheet shows how the values of the factors are implemented for the 
supper cluster runs and shall enable future researcher to do the same. 
 
low level 1 1 40 300 7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
high level 3 99 60 1000 10 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
decimals 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4
factor name #hits conceal speed armor inf DetInf DetVeh Bushm NG TOW Mortar CentricW EW actDef
2 6 47 530 7 1.7188 1.7563 1.3813 1.9625 1.6625 1 0.9438 0.2688 0.6625
3 71 42 595 8 1.1 1.4563 1.7 1.6625 1.9063 1 0.5359 0.3109 0.4094
3 36 59 453 8 1.8313 0.9875 1.3438 1.2875 1.4938 1 0.8875 0.5219 0.5641
2 88 54 617 7 1.3063 1.1188 1.1188 0.95 1.9813 1 0.6625 0.1703 0.2828
3 47 44 311 7 0.9875 1.1 1.5313 1.5313 1.3813 0 0.8594 0.6766 0.6344
2 91 45 639 7 1.5875 0.9688 1.8313 1.8688 0.9313 0 0.8031 0.9016 0.1563
3 19 51 322 8 1.1938 1.8688 1.3063 0.9875 1.325 0 0.9156 0.9578 0.7609
3 76 58 519 8 1.9063 1.6438 0.8188 1.1 1.175 0 0.6766 0.7469 0.1281
2 4 40 869 8 1.5313 1.2688 0.9125 1.7563 1.1563 1 0.4516 0.3953 0.3109
3 68 50 836 7 1.1375 1.9063 1.25 1.6063 0.8 1 0.1281 0.4797 0.8594
2 3 59 672 8 1.325 1.175 1.625 0.8188 1.0813 1 0.2688 0.2969 0.1422
3 52 54 945 8 0.875 1.25 1.775 1.175 1.25 1 0.325 0.5078 0.6203
2 22 47 748 8 1.3813 1.025 1.1375 1.9438 1.9438 0 0.1422 0.9859 0.2547
3 55 48 923 8 1.9625 0.8563 0.8 1.4188 1.4375 0 0.3672 0.5641 0.7047
2 33 56 967 8 1.0625 1.3625 1.925 0.9688 1.7938 0 0.4938 0.9719 0.3672
2 58 51 803 7 1.9438 2 1.475 1.3438 1.775 0 0.1984 0.7188 0.9859
3 44 48 388 9 2 1.7375 1.9625 1.4938 1.5125 0 0.3531 0.4656 0.6766
2 85 45 541 9 1.3438 1.7938 1.7563 1.2313 1.6813 0 0.1 0.1 0.1703
2 39 51 508 9 1.8688 0.8375 1.2875 1.4375 1.7563 0 0.1703 0.2828 0.8875
2 73 57 344 9 1.0063 1.325 1.0063 1.775 1.85 0 0.4797 0.2547 0.325
3 21 48 366 10 1.25 0.8188 1.6438 1.1563 0.9125 0 0.2547 0.6484 0.8313
3 82 40 409 9 1.6438 1.3813 1.8688 1.0063 1.2125 1 0.3813 0.7609 0.2266
3 41 56 475 10 0.95 1.6625 0.95 1.475 1.1938 1 0.3391 0.6063 0.5922
2 99 57 563 9 1.4375 1.4938 1.0625 2 0.875 1 0.2828 0.8734 0.2969
2 26 42 716 9 1.6813 1.925 0.9875 0.9125 0.9875 0 0.6906 0.2125 0.1
3 62 43 1000 9 1.025 1.5688 1.2313 1.25 1.3438 0 0.8734 0.4094 0.6063
3 10 55 858 9 1.8875 1.1938 1.9438 1.7188 1.1 0 0.6344 0.3672 0.1984
3 84 53 880 10 1.175 0.95 1.5875 1.6813 1.2313 0 0.9859 0.1563 0.7469
3 30 43 727 9 1.0438 1.2875 0.8938 1.0625 1.8313 1 0.5922 0.9156 0.3813
2 93 47 814 10 1.9813 1.2125 1.4375 0.875 1.7375 1 0.7047 0.8594 0.6484
2 13 54 694 10 1.2875 1.7188 1.7188 1.9063 1.9625 1 0.5781 0.775 0.1844
3 65 59 902 9 1.5688 1.8875 1.6063 1.5875 1.5313 1 0.7891 0.6625 0.5781
2 50 50 650 9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1 0.55 0.55 0.55
2 94 53 770 10 1.0813 1.0438 1.4188 0.8375 1.1375 0 0.1563 0.8313 0.4375
1 29 58 705 9 1.7 1.3438 1.1 1.1375 0.8938 0 0.5641 0.7891 0.6906
1 64 41 847 9 0.9688 1.8125 1.4563 1.5125 1.3063 0 0.2125 0.5781 0.5359
2 12 46 683 10 1.4938 1.6813 1.6813 1.85 0.8188 0 0.4375 0.9297 0.8172
1 53 56 989 10 1.8125 1.7 1.2688 1.2688 1.4188 1 0.2406 0.4234 0.4656
2 9 55 661 10 1.2125 1.8313 0.9688 0.9313 1.8688 1 0.2969 0.1984 0.9438
1 81 49 978 9 1.6063 0.9313 1.4938 1.8125 1.475 1 0.1844 0.1422 0.3391
1 24 42 781 9 0.8938 1.1563 1.9813 1.7 1.625 1 0.4234 0.3531 0.9719
2 96 60 431 9 1.2688 1.5313 1.8875 1.0438 1.6438 0 0.6484 0.7047 0.7891
1 32 50 464 10 1.6625 0.8938 1.55 1.1938 2 0 0.9719 0.6203 0.2406
2 97 41 628 9 1.475 1.625 1.175 1.9813 1.7188 0 0.8313 0.8031 0.9578
1 48 46 355 9 1.925 1.55 1.025 1.625 1.55 0 0.775 0.5922 0.4797
2 78 53 552 9 1.4188 1.775 1.6625 0.8563 0.8563 1 0.9578 0.1141 0.8453
1 45 52 377 9 0.8375 1.9438 2 1.3813 1.3625 1 0.7328 0.5359 0.3953
2 67 44 333 9 1.7375 1.4375 0.875 1.8313 1.0063 1 0.6063 0.1281 0.7328
2 42 49 497 10 0.8563 0.8 1.325 1.4563 1.025 1 0.9016 0.3813 0.1141
1 56 52 913 8 0.8 1.0625 0.8375 1.3063 1.2875 1 0.7469 0.6344 0.4234
2 15 55 759 8 1.4563 1.0063 1.0438 1.5688 1.1188 1 1 1 0.9297
2 61 49 792 8 0.9313 1.9625 1.5125 1.3625 1.0438 1 0.9297 0.8172 0.2125
2 27 43 956 8 1.7938 1.475 1.7938 1.025 0.95 1 0.6203 0.8453 0.775
1 79 52 934 7 1.55 1.9813 1.1563 1.6438 1.8875 1 0.8453 0.4516 0.2688
1 18 60 891 8 1.1563 1.4188 0.9313 1.7938 1.5875 0 0.7188 0.3391 0.8734
1 59 44 825 7 1.85 1.1375 1.85 1.325 1.6063 0 0.7609 0.4938 0.5078
2 1 43 738 8 1.3625 1.3063 1.7375 0.8 1.925 0 0.8172 0.2266 0.8031
2 75 58 584 8 1.1188 0.875 1.8125 1.8875 1.8125 1 0.4094 0.8875 1
2 38 57 300 8 1.775 1.2313 1.5688 1.55 1.4563 1 0.2266 0.6906 0.4938
1 90 45 442 8 0.9125 1.6063 0.8563 1.0813 1.7 1 0.4656 0.7328 0.9016
1 16 48 420 7 1.625 1.85 1.2125 1.1188 1.5688 1 0.1141 0.9438 0.3531
1 70 58 573 8 1.7563 1.5125 1.9063 1.7375 0.9688 0 0.5078 0.1844 0.7188
2 7 53 486 7 0.8188 1.5875 1.3625 1.925 1.0625 0 0.3953 0.2406 0.4516
2 87 46 606 7 1.5125 1.0813 1.0813 0.8938 0.8375 0 0.5219 0.325 0.9156
1 35 41 398 8 1.2313 0.9125 1.1938 1.2125 1.2688 0 0.3109 0.4375 0.5219
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APPENDIX D. MAIN EFFECT REGRESSION MODELS FOR THE 
INFANTRY CARRIER GCV 
The following regression models are provided to give the reader the 
underlying analysis results for the stated insights and conclusions in the study. 




Figure 57.  Main effect regression models for “BLUE casualties” and “RED 




Figure 58.  Main effect regression models for “Battle duration” and “casualty 




Figure 59.  Main effect regression models for “GCV casualties.” The regression is 
done on the mean. 
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APPENDIX E. PARTITION TREES 
The following graphs show the results for the partition tree models. They 





Figure 60.  Partition tree and split history for the “RED casualty” MOE. The 







Figure 61.  Partition tree and split history for the “casualty ratio” MOE. The 






Figure 62.  Partition tree and split history for the “Battle duration” MOE. The 






Figure 63.  Partition tree and split history for the “GCV casualties” MOE. The 
analysis is conducted on the mean “GCV casualty.” 
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APPENDIX F. INFANTRY CARRYING GCV ADVANCED 
REGRESSION MODELS 
The following results show the final regression model with interactions and 
non-linearities. They will be combined into the “dashboard” in future research and 
are the final analysis results of the conducted study. Each regression model is 
presented with its “actual observed vs. prediction” plot to show how close the 
model is at the observed values. Furthermore, the “summary statistics” for the 
model are stated, and the model itself is shown with each implemented factor. 
Finally, the “Prediction profiler” gives a graphical representation of how variable 
the model is for changes in each included main effect.  
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Figure 64.  Advanced regression model for “RED casualties” conducted on the 




















Figure 67.  Advanced regression model for “CGV casualties” conducted on the 
MOE mean. 
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APPENDIX G. “TANK GCV” MAIN EFFECT REGRESSION 
MODELS 
The following regression models provide the underlying analysis results 
for the stated insights and conclusions in this study. Furthermore, this appendix 
contains additional information on the main effect models for further research. In 
each figure the “Actual vs. Predicted plot” is shown along with a “Pareto plot” 
which gives a visualization of how important the factor is for the model. 
“BLUE casualties” 
 
Figure 68.  Additional graphs for the “BLUE casualties” MOE. 
”RED casualties” 
 
Figure 69.  Additional graphs for the “RED casualties” MOE. 
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 “Battle duration” 
 
Figure 70.  Additional graphs for the “Battle duration” MOE. 
“Casualty ratio” 
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APPENDIX H. “TANK GCV” PARTITION TREES 
The following graphs show the results for the partition tree models. They 
provide important factor thresholds and a picture of the split analysis process. 
 
 
Figure 73.  Partition tree and split history for the “BLUE casualties” MOE. The 
analysis is conducted on the mean “BLUE casualties”. 
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Figure 74.  Partition tree and split history for the “RED casualties” MOE. The 
analysis is conducted on the mean “RED casualties.” 
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Figure 75.  Partition tree and split history for the “Battle duration” MOE. The 




Figure 76.  Partition tree and split history for the “GCV casualties” MOE. The 
analysis is conducted on the mean “GCV casualty.” 
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APPENDIX I. “TANK GCV” ADVANCED REGRESSION MODELS 
The following results show the final regression model with interactions and 
non-linearities. They will be combined into the “dashboard” in future research and 
are the final analysis results of the conducted study. Each regression model is 
presented with its “actual observed vs prediction” plot to show how close the 
model is at the observed values. Furthermore, the “summary statistics” for the 
model are stated and the model itself is shown with each implemented factor. 
Finally, the “Prediction profiler” gives a graphical representation of how variable 
















Figure 80.  Advanced regression model for “BLUE casualties” conducted on the 
MOE mean. 
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